LETTER III.

_Dear Sir, and Brother_,--As I have not the opportunity of presenting your third number to our mutual friend and brother, to whom it most properly belongs to reply, I have thought it no more than reasonable that I should acknowledge the receipt of your favour accompanying this acknowledgement with some observations on the most essential parts of what you have suggested.

You wish us to take it for granted, that those parts of our communications to which you make no reply, are at least, generally speaking, satisfactory to your mind. Respecting this particular, you will suffer me to point out, what appears to me, a very material defect in your proposed method.

Suppose, sir, an argument be laid down on which much depends, in the opinion of the writer, and out of a proper reply to which, he anticipates great advantages; he waits for a reply--No reply comes to this particular, but the very same query which the argument was designed to answer is still urged; is it not easy to see that much labour may be in vain in consequence of this method? If you answer to a question, stating with great seeming earnestness, viewing the question of importance in the mind of him who states it, you would not only expect, but you might really need to be informed what effect your reply was allowed to have in the mind of your opponent. And as he might not anticipate the use which you had designed to make of his answer, you would not judge it advisable to submit to him whether he should reply or not.

You have finally put the dispute about the necessity of retaining the dead languages at issue on the question relative to a future state, in the following words; "If the opinions recorded in scripture relative to a future state of existence are to be relied on, as being dictated by God himself, and in a way too, that was not mistaken; and that the writers of the scriptures being thus inspired, have written nothing but the truth, then I admit," &c. Now from this your own statement you will see the importance of retaining those languages until it be fully discovered that no credit is due to these writings which we have been in the habit of believing to be divinely inspired. Your discernment will at once discover that it would be imprudent in the extreme, to obliterate, without first knowing that what was to be defaced was of no utility. A child, ever so old, who should utterly deface his father's last will and testament, which had made ample provisions for his future wants, merely because he had not a perfect understanding of it, or on suspicion that there were some possible defects in it, could not be considered prudent in so doing. But if the will should finally fail, and prove invalid, no loss would be sustained even if it were committed to the devouring element. To say, the will may be destroyed until it has been proved, would be absurd.

In your further remarks on our brother's communication, you find occasion to suggest a difference between the subject of revelation and the discoveries which have been made by men in the powers and properties of nature. But when you have contended successfully for this (which by no means has any power to refute his argument) you seem not to realize that there must be as great a difference in the evidences by which these different subjects are communicated to the mind, as there are in the subjects themselves. It is acknowledged, without controversy, that we cannot demonstrate by any mathematical or chemical process that there ever was such an emperor in Rome as Augustus Caesar, or such a governor in Judea as Pilate, or such a man as Jesus; but then we are not, on this account, or any other, unable to find such kind of evidence as the nature of the case admits, and such as is sufficient to satisfy the candid mind. Should any one now pretend to deny that Louis XVIth. was beheaded, and allege as proof that no such thing was to be credited, because it had never been discovered as the result of a chemical process, would you hesitate to fault his reasoning?

Should it occur to your mind that you have contended that the evidence of revelation is as different from the evidence required in natural discoveries, as the subjects themselves are different, you are reminded that you have contended for this only with a view to _weaken_ the force of the former, and in a way to disallow its validity. At the same time you state that you do not undertake to deny a special revelation from God, but "wish only to take a review of the evidences, and see if they are such that it is _impossible_ it should be false." Of these evidences you speak thus; "Although ever so clear at first, and ever so well supported by facts, concerning which the witnesses had the clearest evidences, yet the evidences being of such a nature as to preclude a repetition, like those respecting a vision of the night or any other phenomenon, are liable to suffer by passing from one to another," and finally "lose all their strength." Here it seems you pretend to state the character of the evidences of a divine revelation, which evidences you wish to review. Permit me to ask, dear brother, if it would not have appeared more consistent with piety and candor to have reviewed before you fixed the character of the evidences?--There is a proper order in which every thing should be conducted. All our researches should be kept from the embarrassments of prejudice. Though I feel much reluctance in entering on so great a subject as the vindication of the truth of divine revelation, fearing, I should fail in doing that honour to the subject which I am confident it deserves, I am inclined to suggest a few things which I think are worthy of some notice. As you speak of a vision of the night, the evidences of which were clear to the person and satisfactory at the time, those evidences would naturally lose their force when communicated to others and finally lose their strength. Let us suppose a case. A man shall have a vision of the night, in which it shall be revealed to him that some time before the present generation shall leave the stage of life, the kingdom of Great Britain will be overcome by the power of France; that very many of the flourishing cities of England will be destroyed in a very awful manner; that London will be laid level with the ground; that the distress of the inhabitants during the siege will be extreme; that for some time before this great event, there will be wars and rumors of wars among the nations, and certain signs very wonderful will be seen in the heavens. This man tells his vision very circumstantially and several persons write it down. Now suppose as the time passes away, these events, one after another, should take place, all in the same order in which the vision represented them; do you feel willing to say that the evidences of the truth of this vision, are all the time losing their force? No surely they are not; they are all the time gaining strength and waxing brighter. Whether I am able to satisfy you that the above case is a fair representation of the evidences of divine revelation, or not, it discovers in some degree the ground on which, in my mind, revelation is established.

Compare, if you please, the prophesy of Jesus recorded in the 24th of Matthew, with the history of the events of which the divine messenger spake.

Yours, &c.

H. BALLOU.

P. S. You have noticed, no doubt, in a parenthesis, that I do not allow your argument on the dissimilarity of divine revelation and principles of nature to have any force to do away the argument of our brother, to which you replied. It was evidently not his design to argue a similarity between the nature of these widely different subjects, but to show that no greater partiality appears in the divine wisdom, in not discovering the truths of revelation in all ages, to all nations and in all languages, than in its not leading the human mind to the discovery of electricity or any other of the laws of nature in the same manner. Will you endeavour to maintain that the divine economy has nothing to do in directing means and circumstances to the developement of the laws of nature and to the discovery of useful inventions? And if you allow it has, why do you not assign a reason why these discoveries should not have been made in all ages, to all nations, and written or rather _printed_, in all languages that cannot as well be applied in the other case? In this way you would do away his reasoning and my own likewise, for as you notice, we were both of one mind on this subject.

Before I close this postscript, I wish to remark on the subject which you have in view, in reviewing the evidences of divine revelation, which you say is to "see if they are such that it is _impossible_ it should be false." Now it appears to your humble servant, that faith does not require evidence of the description you lay down. I grant it wants to be satisfied and it has a right to expect it; it feels under no obligation to evidence which comes short of conviction; but it does not require all _possibility_ to be taken into its account. This would seem to go beyond the limits of faith and enter into the regions of certainty. If the evidences in support of faith be sufficient to give rest, peace, and consolation to the mind, and if the faith be strong enough to effect the conduct of the believer in a proper manner, the object of faith is obtained.

The hopes of the husbandman may serve to illustrate this particular. He does not know for certainty that his fields will produce him any thing; he does not know that the coming season will be favourable to his crops, yet he plants and sows in comfortable expectation. He rises early and labours cheerfully, his expectations are full of comfort, he sleeps quietly and enjoys content. But if you ask him whether he views it _impossible_ that he should fail of a harvest? he will with but very little concern answer in the negative.

"The just shall live by faith, we walk by faith and not by sight." All, therefore, that we can reasonably expect in the case before us, is to find a decided _balance_ of evidence in favour of the religion of the gospel. And to _review_ the evidences of this religion, it seems necessary first to allow that there are evidences in existence which go to prove it, if their validity be allowed. For instance, the four evangelists, the acts of the apostles, together with the epistles of the apostles are considered evidences of the truth of this religion. And can you reasonably require more until you are able to show that all these come short of establishing the credibility of the facts which they relate with apparent honesty and simplicity not to be met with in any other ancient writings?

There are a great many other evidences which serve to corroborate those mentioned, but if you can do _them_ away, no doubt the others may be as easily removed.

You will duly consider that in disproving the religion of Jesus Christ, you disprove all religion, for I am satisfied that you will not pretend that you are making a choice between the gospel and some other doctrine. No, the choice is between the gospel and no religion at all.

Come then, strip away all the clouds of superstition, and demonstrate at once that there has been no sun in the firmament during the whole of a cloudy day! Soar like the strong pinioned eagle, make your tour beyond the mists of error and bring us the joyless tidings that there is no clear sky in the heavens. Can you imagine any thing to be more pleasing than the coming of one that brought _good_ tidings? But let us have the worst of it. Show from undoubted authority that there never was such a man as Jesus, or show that he was a wicked impostor and deservedly lost his life. Show moreover, that there never were such men as the apostles of Jesus, or that they were likewise impostors, and all suffered death for their wicked impiety! Give the particulars of Saul's madly forsaking the honourable connexion in which he stood, for the sake of practising a fraud which produced him an immense income of suffering!

But you say the apostles were not bad men. Very well, then let us see how good men could tell so many things which they knew were not true, and suffer and die in attestation of what they knew to be false. You will see the danger of supposing that honest men can bear testimony to falsehood under the pretence of doing good, as this would destroy all testimony at once; even your own cannot be relied on after you maintain this abominable principle, which has been practised a wicked priesthood for ages. H.B.

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EXTRACTS No. IV.

[The objector in his fourth number begins by explaining himself in some particulars wherein he had not been fully understood, and also by making some concessions respecting the importance of retaining the original languages in which the scriptures were written; and, bringing these remarks to a close, he proceeds as follows:]

"In regard to a revelation from God, the three propositions which you have stated answer my mind well enough, as far as they go, to which, however, I would wish to add a fourth; and ask, admitting the three first propositions true. 'Fourth. Is it reasonable to suppose that the apostles had any other means of forming their opinions relative to a future state than what passed before their eyes?--viz. the miracles of Christ, the circumstances attending his death, his resurrection, and the miracles wrought by themselves in his name?'

"1st. Is it reasonable to suppose that God has ever made a special revelation to man?

"You say I have acknowledged that a divine revelation 'if real, is of all truths the most important;' hence you call upon the 'eye of reason' to examine this proposition to see why it should be considered more important than the discoveries made in the arts and sciences, &c. I think these questions may be easily and correctly answered. One relates to the blessings of _eternity_; and the others to those only of _time_; hence if the truths manifested by a revelation had been of no more importance to man than the truths in natural philosophy, reason would say, God would have left them also to be discovered, if discovered at all, like all other truths, without a special revelation. But, you must excuse me for not being able to see the force and conclusiveness of your reasoning, when you say that my 'allowing it any importance at all, is, in the eye of reason, an argument in its support.' Supposing I am informed of a large estate bequeathed to me by some benefactor. I acknowledge that it is very important to me, if true, as I am in great need; yet I do not believe it true. Now, is my acknowledging its importance, if true, an argument in support of its truth? If it is so, the reason of it is out of my sight.

"I should think that the reason of man (the only reason with which we are acquainted) would hardly undertake to say whether a revelation is either necessary or not necessary. The only evidence that reason can have of its necessity is its truth; and a supposition that it is not true equally supposes it not to be necessary. For to suppose otherwise supposes that God has omitted something which was necessary to be done! Try the matter as it respects a new revelation. Who will undertake to say that a new revelation either is or is not necessary? No one who believes in a revelation will deny the possibility of such an event. Suppose then for the moment it is true; and something is brought to light infinitely more glorious than any thing of which the human mind has yet conceived; will any one say it is unimportant? Or is the 'allowing it any importance--an argument in its support?'

"I am very ready to allow that a 'divinely munificent Creator would not omit any thing which is of importance to his intelligent creatures:' and on this ground I admitted the _importance_ of revelation 'if real;' but I am yet unable to see how this is any argument in its support. It seems to me that this argument might be turned right the other way with equal force. If revelation be not true, it is not necessary it should be; and man can be made just as happy in this world by knowing all that he can know without it, as those are who believe in it; and admitting it not true there is no more importance in all the stories about it, than there is in the _Alcoran_! Now, supposing you should 'allow' all this, would it be any argument against the truth of revelation? I think not.

"In answer therefore to the first particular, I must be allowed to say that the only reason in favour of a divine revelation must grow out of the evidence in support of the facts on which it is predicated; for, aside from those evidences, I do not see why mankind should be taught to believe in a future life and immortality by special revelation, any more than they should be taught the arts and sciences by special revelation; yet reason does not reject the evidences of such an event when they are made clear to the understanding.--Therefore, it appears to me that your first proposition is involved in the second, viz.

"2d. Is the resurrection of Jesus capable of being proved?

"I should have said something more on the subject which was answered in your first number, and which I neglected to acknowledge in my second, if it had occurred to me as being necessary. I will briefly state here that your reasoning on that subject is satisfactory; and if a revelation can be fully proved I feel not disposed to complain on account of its seeming partiality. Infinite wisdom dispenses his blessings so as best to answer his benevolent designs; and were we to object to the _manner_, merely because we do not comprehend the _equality_, we should be satisfied, strictly speaking, with nothing.

"But you have excused yourself from undertaking to prove your second proposition in a way that I did not expect, viz. by finding, as you supposed, in my words, an acknowledgement of its truth. Here again I must confess my misfortune in giving too much grounds for the wrong construction. Every one knows however the ambiguity of words, and how the meaning of a sentence may be altered by placing the emphasis on a different word from what the author intended. I acknowledge that my words will admit the construction you have given them; yet you could but see that it was giving up at once what I had in a number of places, both before and after, considered a main question. And then, you ask me why I wish you to prove what I acknowledge to be true. If you will be good enough to review the passage, and notice that the word _substantially_ was emphatic, and contrasted with _circumstantial_, a little below, you will perceive that my meaning was simply this. No one will pretend that the evangelists were correct in every minute particular, but only correct in _substance_; and by the ALL, by whom this will be admitted, I mean those who believe in divine revelation; that even they would acknowledge, that in point of correctness, the writers were 'no more' than _substantially_ so. However:

"You think if I am 'disposed to doubt,' &c. it is my province to bring forward my 'strong reasoning,' &c. I know of no disposition that I feel respecting the subject but to ascertain, if possible, the truth. If I have doubts, it is not because I choose to doubt, but because I cannot help them; and if I have faith it is such as is given me. Of one thing I have no doubt; that is, that the truth, whatever it is, is right. But:

"Admitting the scriptures are not true, I shall not attempt to guess what is true respecting the subjects to which they relate. For I might guess a hundred different ways to account for what we know is true, and all of them be wrong.

"My doubts on this subject are nothing more than _doubts_; they do not amount to a confirmed _unbelief_; because they admit the possibility of the account's being true.

"Yours, &c.

A. KNEELAND."