I'd far prefer as a Philospher to follow and study:

 

Pure practical reason, in determining the moral law or categorical imperative, determines what ought to be done without reference to empirical contingent factors. This is the sense in which his meta-ethical position is objectivist rather than subjectivist; moral questions are determined independently of reference to the particular subject posing them. It is the fact that morality is determined by pure practical reason rather than particular empirical or sensuous factors that ensures morality has a universal validity.

 

This moral universalism has come to be seen as the distinctive aspect of Kant's moral philosophy, and has had wide social impact in the legal and political concepts of human rights and equality. The categorical imperative appears in at least 3 different formulations, the most famous two of which are 1) treat humanity in oneself and others always as an end and never merely as a means; and 2) act only on a maxim which you could will to be a universal law. Kant also says that the various formulations of the categorical imperative are all different ways of expressing the very same principle, which is deeply rooted in the connection between reason, the moral law and human freedom.

 

Freedom and autonomy

In contrast to David Hume, Kant viewed the human individual as a rationally autonomous self-conscious being with full freedom of action and self-determination. For a will to be considered "free", we must understand it as capable of affecting causal power without being caused to do so. But the idea of lawless free will, that is, a will acting without any causal structure, is incomprehensible. Therefore, a free will must be acting under laws that it gives to itself.

Although Kant conceded that there could be no conceivable example of free will, because any example would only show us a will as it appears to us �?as a subject of natural laws �?he nevertheless argued against determinism. He proposed that determinism is logically inconsistent: The determinist claims that because A caused B, and B caused C, that A is the true cause of C. Applied to a case of the human will, a determinist would be arguing that the will does not have causal power because something else had caused the will to act as it did. But that argument merely assumes what it set out to prove; that the human will is not part of the causal chain.

Secondly, Kant remarks that free will is inherently unknowable.

Since even a free person could not possibly have knowledge of his own freedom, we cannot use our failure to find a proof for freedom as evidence for a lack of it.

The observable world could never contain an example of freedom because it would never show us a will as it appears to itself, but only a will that is subject to natural laws imposed on it. But we do appear to ourselves as free.

Therefore he argued for the idea of transcendental freedom �?that is, freedom as a presupposition of the question "what ought I to do?" This is what gives us sufficient basis for ascribing moral responsibility: the rational and self-actualizing power of a person, which he calls moral autonomy: "the property the will has of being a law unto itself."

 

 Good will, duty, and the categorical imperative

Since considerations of the physical details of actions are necessarily bound up with a person's subjective preferences, and could have been brought about without the action of a rational will, Kant concluded that the expected consequences of an act are themselves morally neutral, and therefore irrelevant to moral deliberation. The only objective basis for moral value would be the rationality of the good will, expressed in recognition of moral duty.

Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law set by the categorical imperative.

 Because the consequences of an act are not the source of its moral worth, the source must be the maxim under which the act is performed, irrespective of all aspects or faculties of desire.

 Thus, an act can have moral content if, and only if, it is carried out solely with regard to a sense of moral duty; it is not enough that the act be consistent with duty, it must be carried out in the name of fulfilling a duty.