September 1775 found the Continental Army under Washington still besieging the British in Boston. The forces, originally organized as the Department of New York under Gen Philip Schuyler, a former militia supply officer, had been re-designated as the Northern Army stationed at Ticonderoga and Crown Point. It was a small army that was now on it’s way north toward Montreal. Meanwhile Arnold and his men detached by Washington fought their way through the wilds of Maine on their way to Quebec.

With a two pronged expedition to free Canada underway and the siege of Boston in good order there was a false but popular belief that it would be a short war. Even Washington expected a short campaign. Short campaign or not, it still left the problem of maintaining morale and effectiveness of an army based on the present system of short enlistments. Washington believed that even if it turned out to be a short campaign he could not be assured of a successful army based on militia rules. What he needed was an army committed for the duration of the war. However what is needed and necessary is not always what you get. Washington had no choice but to use the existing system of militia while he worked toward longer enlistments or enlistments for the duration of the war.

The Continental Army had been designated by Congress, but designation alone did not create an effective army. The army was lacking in many ways, especially it’s dependence on Militia and their rather loose definition of military duties. During this month of September Congress visited the encampment around Boston, emerging with a plan of organization for the army, modeled on the tables of organization of the British Army.

Washington had early seen that many changes must be made and had already instituted reforms. New England troops in particular were a problem as they considered every man equal - regardless of rank. Since every man was equal, they might or might not have sufficient regard for their officers and their orders to allow for an effective administration of military activities. To correct this defect Washington distanced Officers from the Non-Commissioned Officers and the Enlisted ranks. He made discipline more rigorous, and punishment for infractions more severe, achieving greater respect for officers and the importance of strictly obeying orders.

Despite all of the problems of holding an army together, Washington must maintain the siege of Boston. To fail to do so would mean that Britain would be free to exact their form of justice against each and every man who had ever served in the army around Boston and in the Congress which authorized that army and siege. Every man involved would be held responsible, singularly or severally. There was no going back. To withdraw or be defeated at this point would result in heavy retribution by the Crown. There would be, if the siege was lifted, hangings and in some cases the burning of towns. I believe that it was Ben Franklin who coined the adage, “We must hang together or surely we will hang separately.�?During the duration of the war such punishment by British commanders came true for lesser offenses than authorizing the siege of Boston or being a participant in the siege.

We leave Washington with a much, improved army but one that would disappear when enlistments expired on December 31st.

One of the immediate problems was to raise a new army in the intervening months. Immediately Washington must find means to not only keep the men warm in the ramshackle huts that surrounded Boston but wood for fires must be accumulated. Even now in September the nights seemed to grow colder each day. Soon there would be the cold fall rains followed by snow and the harsh winds of winter. He must find a better way to house the troops.

We leave Washington to find his own way as we begin to follow Montgomery and Arnold on their invasion of Canada