MSN Home  |  My MSN  |  Hotmail
Sign in to Windows Live ID Web Search:   
go to MSNGroups 
Free Forum Hosting
 
Important Announcement Important Announcement
The MSN Groups service will close in February 2009. You can move your group to Multiply, MSN’s partner for online groups. Learn More
The History Page[email protected] 
  
What's New
  
  Message Boards  
  For New Members  
  On This Day....  
  General  
  American History  
  Ancient History  
  British History  
  Current Events  
  European History  
  The Civil War  
  War  
  World History  
  Pictures  
    
    
  Links  
  Militaria Board  
  Cars/Motorcycles  
  
  
  Tools  
 
War : WW1 1918 and the last Hundred Days
Choose another message board
 
     
Reply
 Message 1 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameArnie-113  (Original Message)Sent: 4/16/2007 7:20 PM
To reply I have started a new thread to accommodate.
 
The last 100 days of WW1 was probably the greatest period in the British Army's history. In spite of Pete claiming it as Canada's, most of the fighting was done by the British Army, whether it was stopping the German March offensive to the great advance.
 
The appearance of the AEF was far out weighed by the collapse of Russia, allowing over a million well trained battle hardend troop to be deployed in the westThere was no canadian or Australian involvement in stopping the German March offensive although the New Zeeland division was present.
 
Pete tells us that the Ameins victory was a Dominion one, thats is that It was a Canadian and Australian affair The Attack on the 8th August was the first action the Canadians had taken part in during the whole of 1918 He also feails to tell that the Canadian Corps had one british Division in it. The Candian Division was the strongest  in the army at that time simply because it had not been recently involved in Battle. A Canadian Division was over 12,000 strong a British and Australian were little more than 7000..
 
The attack at Ameins had the British III Corps on the left the Canadians and Australians in the centre and a French Corps on the right.The attack was supported by 342 Mark V tanks, 72 Whippet Tanks, and 120 supply tanks all British. Apart from the Divisional and Corp artillery the Attack was supported 500 British Heavy Guns. Their counter battery fire virtually destroyed the German artillery. The RAF was over head and for the first time they provided air resupply to the leading divisions. There was also a British Cavalry division in reserve. What Peter fails to recognise that the BEF's newly devised way of war Made the use of so called elite infantry less neccessary for avictory. As it was a combination of well trained but not elite infantry, Tanks, Aircraft and more than any thing Artillery with a well devised fire plan. Of course, all these assets were British. 
 
Arnie
 


First  Previous  25-39 of 39  Next  Last 
Reply
 Message 25 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameArnie-113Sent: 4/18/2007 5:05 PM
Tincaan
 
Your arguments are typical of some one who has nothing to add but smart mouth comments that  are easy to make but have no real meaning. But unfortunately the British army achievements are second to none.
 
Morepete
 
I know about Hindenburg line and Burlon wood however two points. The Nord canal was dry the St Quentin is wet deap and wide also you are talking about a Corp with nearly the strength of a division. My story is about the 46th Division.
 
Jimbert I have my numbers about the US army of 1917 from the US official history of the US Army. Before US went to war the Army mobalised over 200,000 men and 90,000 national Guard for operations in Mexico. These troops because of the out break of war were not demobalised.
 
Bowlegs.
 
The Irish fought as part of the British Army its Regiments were intregal in the Army's establishment. When battle honours were awarded inthe 20s even the Irish Regiments that originally recruited from the South and were disbanded on Formation of the Irish republic (to be) were awarded their battle honour. Its only in the last couple of years that the Republic have honoured their own dead of the war with a memorial in France. However the two Irish Divisions the 10th and 36th have their own memorials on the old battle fields.
 
Tanks theMark V was good enough to break the impasse of trench warfare.
 
Arnie

Reply
 Message 26 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameArnie-113Sent: 4/18/2007 5:31 PM

Tin can

The following extract as been put together from the following books on the subject some of them are American. See:

"Test of Battle" by Paul F Braim (US)

"The Rainbow Division in the Great War 1917-19" by James J Coooke (US)

"Pershing" by James J Cooke (US)

"The Dough Boys" by Gary Mead (UK)

"Forgotten Victory Myths and Realities By Gary Sheffield (UK)

"History of the First World War" by Basil Lidle Hart (UK)

Arnie

Enter the Americans

The American and British armies shared a common strategic heritage. Before the First World War, both were essentially colonial gendarmeries. Just within living memory, the US army~ had fought in a very large war indeed �?the Civil War although Sherman’s and Grant’s tactics were still being taught in US military academies John J. Pershing was as experienced as any American soldier in 1917, bnt his background was in small wars and what today would be referred to as counter-insurgency. In the 1890s he had fought against the ‘Ghost Dance�?uprising, the last major rebellion of Native Americans and in 1898 he had had a taste of more conventional operations in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. Pershing’s last major assigmnent before being appointed to command the American Expeditionary Force was taking 11,000 men �?the largest force he had ever led �?in pursuit of Pancho Villa, a Mexican bandit. Like the previous experience of his British counterparts, this was of questionable value as preparation for command of a mass army on the Western Front.

Pershing was unimpressed by the tactical methods of his British and French allies. He believed that they had led to a diminution of their spirit of aggression, with trench fighting leading to the possession of ground becoming the main focus of attacks. ‘Black Jack�?was convinced that this had caused some commanders to forget that ‘the real objective was the enemy’s army�? and ‘to bring about a decision, that army must be driven from the trenches and the fighting carried into the open�? Furthermore, Pershing believed that trench warfare could be broken:

'It is here that the infantryman with his rifle, supported by the Machine guns, the tanks, the artillery, the airplanes and all determines the issue Through adherence to this principle7 the American soldier, taught how to shoot, how to take advantage of the terrain, and how-to rely on hasty entrenchment, shall retain the ability to drive the enemy from Ins trenches and by the same tactics, defeat him in the open.'

The order in which Pershing lists the elements of-the battle is interesting. Many European commanders of 1914-15 would have agreed with Pershing’s views, but they had failed dismally to translate desire to fulfilment ( But they like Pershing had no tanks, aircraft and heavy guns). -

The bloody battles of subsequent-years had taught the British and French the severe liniitatiims of the infantryman and they had moved towards the integrated all-arms approach. Pershing’s tactical ideas were a throwback to a discredited way of fighting, compounded by lack of appropriate training.

Liddell Hart commented that:

“Pershing thought that he was spreading a new gospel of faith when  it was actually an old faith exploded�?

The results were disastrous for the AEF. The parallels between the American offensives of 1918 and the BEF on the Somme are unmistakable. In both eases enthusiastic citizen soldiers launched clumsy, frontal assaults; in both cases the inexperience of commanders and staffs was all too evident.

General von Unruh, the Chief of staff of German IV Reserve Corps, noted that at Château Thierry and Belleau Wood. In June 1918 he saw young regiments coming on in masses, exactly the same as earlier in the war I had seen the Russians advance�?

Some American division. Were of high quality, among them the 2nd a joint Army-Marine formation, and the 32nd and 42nd (Rainbow division) of National Guardsmen. Generally, though, the AEF’~ allies and enemies were critical of American tactical performance. as indeed were some of the AEF’s own reports. A German assessment of the Meuse-Argonne offensive stated bluntly that: ‘The American Infantry is very unskilful in the attack. It attacks in thick columns, in numerous waves echeloned in depth, preceded by tanks. This sort of attack offers excellent objectives for the fire of our artillery, infantry and machine gm1s.’~ Ironically, given Pershing’s obsession with the rifle, German reports indicate that some Americans taken prisoner had only the scantiest of training with their primary weapon, an assessment confirmed by the AEF’s own reports.

Many of the AEF’s tactical problems can be put down to sheer inexperience. In their attack on the Hindenburg Line while operating as part of British Fourth Army, US 108th Infantry Regiment neglected mopping-up operations, with the result that German machine gunners bypassed by the initial waves were able to fire on American stretcher bearers and cut off  whole companies. This is the sort of mistake that the BEF had learned not to make as a result of the Somme and no doubt many of AEF’s errors would have been corrected in time for the spring campaign of 1919, had it occurred. Likewise, the weakness in battlefield leadership and! staff work would have been rectified by experience. Nevertheless, Pershing was culpable in two respects in his tactical doctrine and in his reluctance to allow comprehensive ‘amalgamation�?The latter was the idea of allowing US units and formations to serve under British or French command Pershing, determined to command an American Army. in the field, fiercely resisted this proposal, fearing that AEF would simply be used as piecemeal reinforcements for Petain and Haig, but reluctance to accept temporary amalgamation, to allow American units to take advantage of the experience of the Allies, was a mistake that cost American soldiers their lives- For instance, they did not need to work out the details of flash spotting and sound ranging for artillery, the British showed them to do it.

Yet Pershing distrusted the advice given by French and British instructors, whom he regarded as peddlers of trench warfare dogma, and refused to accept more help in training from these quarters. Liddel Hart Tells us; 

<DIR>

Up to a point, Pershing was justified in wishing to concentrate open- warfare rather than trench fighting. His mistake was ignoring the careful battle techniques that had evolved by 1918 A US Marine Corps report of 1918 suggests that the British espoused ‘the system limited objectives�?through weakness, it ‘appears�? the report concludes ‘to have been due to the mobility of the staff to keep pace with the advance of their most aggressive troops in the battles of 1916 - 1917�? This report however fails to mention  the absence of reliable battle field communications that plagued the allies, until the arrival of the battle field radio in late 1918.

</DIR>

American historians have been scathing about Pershing’s methods Paul F Braim goes as far as to say that ‘In the main there weren’t tactics employed Committing hundreds of thousands of infantry in a narrow zone directly against heavily fortified and defended positions guaranteed high casualties and small gains �?James J Cooke rejects Pershing’s criticism of the training of American training instead pointing to the difficulties of frontal assaults against positions held by resolute defenders These are criticisms familiar to any who has studied the British army on the Somme m 1916.

By Armistice in November 1918, the AEF was dangerously close to played out Its logistic system was groaning under the strain: it had taken 250,000 casualties on the battlefield. At the ~same time, though, the AEF was beginning to show distinct improvements. The appointment in October1918 of General Hunter Liggett to command US First Army was a key moment. Liggett was a methodical commander, a sort of American Plummer (GOC British Second Army) to Pershing’s Haig, whose hallmark was careful staff work and attention -to detail. In short, he was a general who did not try to make his troops run before they could walk.


Reply
 Message 27 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameArnie-113Sent: 4/18/2007 5:37 PM
Pete
 
#25 I say the strength of a division what I mean is an army (2 corps)
 
Arnier
 
 

Reply
 Message 28 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameFlashman8Sent: 4/18/2007 7:09 PM
THE ACTUAL BATTLE FOR THE ST QUENTIN CANAL.The 46th Division were on the high ground. The canal was 35 ft. wide. [xvi] There was wire in the water and on the banks and flanking emplacements.  The southern portion ran on the level.  The bottom was covered with a little water and eight feet of mud.  To the north the water ranged from seven to ten feet deep at the bottom. The cutting had sides sloping about 50° and as much as 50 ft. deep.  The Canal walls throughout were 10 ft. high and faced with brick. [xvii] The southern portion was more heavily defended than the northern. The enemy’s defences were west of the canal on a rise. These consisted of a continuous line of trenches, with strong points and  machine gun nests in it, protected by a wide wire entanglement.  The crossings at Bellenglise and Riqueval  Bridge were defended with wire and machinegun posts 

 

The position consisted of a front trench and a support line which was about 300 yards behind it.  There were wire belts, concrete machine gun and field gun emplacements. Below the support line  the tunnel hid the reserves.  Behind the main system were the  Hindenburg Support Line and Hindenburg Reserve Line- this was also known as the Beaurevoir Line. These were both single, partly constructed lines.   On the 8th  of August 1918 the plans of the defences had been captured.�?SPAN>  It contained the situation of every dugout ,machine gun emplacement, battle station and headquarters, sound ranging, flashed washing and observation posts, even barrage lines.  It also revealed signal communications, electric power installations and ammunition and supply depots, railheads, billets, balloon sheds and landing grounds.  The scheme was unabated differently drawn up early in 1917.[v]  

 <O:P> </O:P>

were waiting on the start line. [x]

 <O:P> </O:P>

Fourth Army’s attack was preceded by a bombardment fired by 1044 field guns and howitzers and 593 medium heavy guns and howitzers which began at 10:30 p.m. on the 26th and continued until zero.  The British version of mustard gas was fired against artillery and headquarters.  High explosive and shrapnel was used to destroy key points including strong points, defended localities, the entrances of tunnels and dugouts telephone exchanges to cut wire entanglements and to demoralise the Germans.  6 in. howitzers were used to disrupt the enemy’s sleep during the nights from the 26th /27th  through to the night of the 28th/ 29th September. [xi]

 <O:P> </O:P>

The IX Corps had to force the St Quentin Canal and 46th  (1st North Midland) Division was to cross the Canal and take the  first objective.  The 32nd Division would pass through and take the second. 1st  Division would use elements to follow the right of the 46th Division and form a flank as far as Bellenglise.  The 6th Division on the right of the corps would maintain a defensive attitude but keep contact with the enemy and use gas and smoke.[xii]

 <O:P> </O:P>

The 46th(North Midland) Division. was a Territorial Division which Griffiths says had a poor reputation until it took the crossing at Riqueval on the 29th September 1918 [xiii] There was a marked distrust of Territorials among regulars. 137th  Brigade consisted of various battalions from Staffordshires, 138th  Brigade battalions from the Lincolns and Leicesters and 139th Brigade battalions from Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire although by 1918 the regional associations had long been removed by new posting methods. [xiv]

 <O:P> </O:P>

The 32nd Division, which followed it was New Army. Its three brigades were the 96th , 97th , and 14th.[xv] Wilfred Owens 2nd Manchesters were part of the 96th Brigade at this time and he won the Military Cross during the crossing.

 <O:P> </O:P>

The 46th Division were on the high ground. The canal was 35 ft. wide. [xvi] There was wire in the water and on the banks and flanking emplacements.  The southern portion ran on the level.  The bottom was covered with a little water and eight feet of mud.  To the north the water ranged from seven to ten feet deep at the bottom. The cutting had sides sloping about 50° and as much as 50 ft. deep.  The Canal walls throughout were 10 ft. high and faced with brick. [xvii] The southern portion was more heavily defended than the northern. The enemy’s defences were west of the canal on a rise. These consisted of a continuous line of trenches, with strong points and  machine gun nests in it, protected by a wide wire entanglement.  The crossings at Bellenglise and Riqueval  Bridge were defended with wire and machinegun posts  .  .

 <O:P> </O:P>

The move was rehearsed on the Somme first. Life belts, rafts, mud mats lifelines and scaling ladders were provided.  Twelve engineer companies were detailed to repair bridges.

 <O:P> </O:P>

The 137th Brigade was to spearhead the assault.  The 138th  and 139th  Brigades were to follow. The 6/ South Staffordshire, 5/ South Staffordshire and 6/ North Staffordshire were in the van.  The barrage moved at a rate of 100 yards in 2 minutes.  After crossing three halts were to be made on the eastern bank and to intermediate lines. [xviii]

 <O:P> </O:P>

At 5:50 a.m. the assault was launched the Canal offences had been destroyed by heavy artillery.  The field artillery barrage was predicted but extremely effective. The mist helped the attackers.

 <O:P> </O:P>

137th Brigade stormed the outpost line and western trenches. The German counter barrage fell on both British and Germans.  The Staffordshires reached the canal on time with few casualties.  In the southern sector they crossed on rafts and lifelines and the northern sector they used life belts and planks.  Riqueval Bridge was secured by the 6/ North Staffordshire, which rushed the machinegun on it before it could be blown up.

 <O:P> </O:P>

The 137th Brigade reorganised behind a standing barrage and went forward again at 7:30 a.m. to the first intermediate line.  The German scattered in the fog and smoke.  They paused half an hour and then the supporting companies passed through.  Two companies made for the Bellenglise Tunnel.  The western entrance had been blocked. They destroyed the entrances and captured 800 prisoners in the tunnel. [xix]

One of the extraordinary things about this attack is how much had been accomplished in a period of 1 hour and 40 minutes. It is clear that the artillery preparation had been thorough and effective. The movement of the attacking brigade the 137th   was smooth and the leapfrog by the next formation went of easily. Yet it appears to be a position every bit as strong as that which held the British and Imperial forces for much longer in 1916 and 1917.  <O:P> </O:P>

By  8.20 a.m. all three battalions reached the second intermediate line just as the barrage lifted off it.  They captured a four gun battery.

 <O:P> </O:P>

The divisional observers could see little. Information was brought back by messengers.  The General Officer Commanding issued orders to 139th and 138th  Brigades to push over.  They were already moving, having started at 8:30 a.m. and  they mopped up Bellenglise on the way and met up with 137th Brigade on the second intermediate line.  At 9:30 a.m. the GOC asked for the Cavalry Brigade but it arrived too late, after the German’s panic was over.

 <O:P> </O:P>

The 139th and 138th  Brigades advanced again at 11:20 a.m. behind a barrage and accompanied by a tanks of the 9th  Battalion which arrived late.  The 139th and 138th  had two intermediate pause lines, one half a mile eastward, the second a thousand yards on. This left a half mile before the first objective.  They reached the first line had known.  The smoke had dissipated and the 130 night Brigades came under fire from the area to the south of the Canal in front of the 1st  Division and its tanks were knocked out.  The 6th  Sherwood Foresters went cross the Canal and attacked the artillery. [xx] The final line- the first objective was reached by both brigades by 3:30 p.m. 138th  Brigade lost two tanks. Lehaucourt was cleared by four o’clock.  Magny la Fosse was also captured.  This sort of the 46th Division had been a brilliant success The division then formed defensive flanks.

 <O:P> </O:P>

The 14th and 97th  Brigades of the 32nd Division crossed the canal at Bellenglise and Riqueval Bridge.  By 5:30 p.m. they were with 46th  Division. At 6 p.m. the brigades of the 2nd  Division went forward under a barrage.  The Germans had a chance to re organise.  The 14th Brigade reached the second objective capturing le Tronquoy and Fleche Wood.  They captured 300 prisoners three12 in. howitzers and three 4.2 in. guns.  Three of its tanks were knocked out.  The 97th Brigade was checked by fire from Levergies and did not reach the second objective.  It lost two Whippets out of ten. The division then formed defensive flanks.

 <O:P> </O:P>

The 1st  Division with the 3rd  Brigade on the right and the 1st  Brigade on the left protected the right of the 46th  Division and advanced three quarters of a mile to the St Quentin-Bellicourt Road.  They then tried to reach the Thorigny-le Tronquoy Road but received heavy enfilade fire from South and forced to return to the St Quentin Road.  The 6th  Division patrolled its area.  The IX Corps had taken 5100 prisoners and 90 guns, hundreds of machine guns, and trench mortars.  The 46th  Division to 4200 prisoners and 72 guns.[xxi]


 Excuse the undiluted Google, but it shows it was a bit more than just jumping over a canal cutting..

 <O:P> </O:P>

 


Reply
 Message 29 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameFlashman8Sent: 4/18/2007 7:58 PM
Arnie
Your 25
Think you've misintrepreted TinCan
long standing joke between us
Peter

Reply
 Message 30 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameFlashman8Sent: 4/18/2007 8:09 PM
Hello JimBert,
Your #19, your Zimmerman letters, in 1924, we have our Zinoviev letters

The "Zinoviev Letter" is thought to have been instrumental in the Conservative Party's victory in the United Kingdom general election, 1924, which ended the country's first Labour government.

In 1999, an official enquiry (see Telegraph, 5 February 1999) finally determined that the letter had probably been a concoction by elements of the SIS (MI6) based in Riga, Latvia to help the Conservatives defeat Labour in the 1924 election. In 2006, a new biography of Desmond Morton, Churchill's Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence by Gill Bennett, confirmed that it was a hoax perpetated by Morton, then with the Secret Intelligence Service of the British government. [1]

The letter was allegedly addressed from Grigori Zinoviev, president of the presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (Comintern), and Arthur MacManus, the British representative on the presidium, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain. It purported to advocate intensified Communist agitation in Britain, not least in the armed forces.

Of course, a forgery.

Peter


Reply
 Message 31 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameArnie-113Sent: 4/19/2007 6:25 PM
Jimbert
 
There is no proof but the Zimmerman letter was also a forgery. The germans knew so Zimmerman must have also known that Germany could not possibly carried out his promises (If he ever made them) There was the Atlantic and the Royal Navy in between Germany and Mexico.
 
Somewhere on the web their is a document with the proceeding in the Senate before the US declared war and most of it is taken up with the worry that American banks would loose the money they had loaned If Germany defeated the allies which it looked increasing more likely with the State of Russia. The US did in fact loose money with the Russian collapse. So I would I would have thought that most people in the US would not have gone to war to save the banks money, do you?
 
Arnie
 
PS my description of 46 Division's crossing of the Nord canal came from my head sorry that you required so much detail.

Reply
 Message 32 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameArnie-113Sent: 4/19/2007 6:55 PM
Flash
 
Your message #30 It purported to advocate intensified Communist agitation in Britain, not least in the armed forces.
 
In September 1931, The Conservative Government  decided to reduce the Armed forces  wages. The Admiralty promised that the new wage rates would not be applied to men who had been in the service for over a year. The action had been based on the Aramy and RAF  were only 10% of personel would be affected. Whilst in the Navy 75% were affected
 
The sailors decided to go on strike, they ensured that all the esential duties were still carried and were at all times respectful to their officers. However the situation was made worse when an Admiral told the strikers that the reduction would not be a problem that their wives could take in washing.
 
The Government promised that no disciplinary action would be taken against the strikers. However the so called ring leaders wer taken from their ships sent to a naval barracks and put through training equivelent to that suffered by men undergoing detention. No charges were placed against the men but all of their careers came to a halt until the out break of WW2. The reason given for the strike were that Communists were blamed for stirring up trouble. a convenient excuse at the time with the fear of Reds under the beds. I don't think fo a minute that the reduction in pay etc had any think to do with the strike, do you?
 
Arnie

Reply
 Message 33 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameFlashman8Sent: 4/19/2007 7:26 PM
No Arnie
Bolshie lot, those matelots. I mean, that was only 5 minutes after the Nore and Spithead mutinies.
And what about the Potemkin? Can't trust a sailor an inch.
Peter

Reply
 Message 34 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameArnie-113Sent: 4/23/2007 6:57 PM

Tin can

Whilst the AEF was drownding under a mass of inefficiency and lack of correct training, The british Army apart from carrying the weight of the war in France against the Germans. It was also leading the way to the destruction of Germany's Central Powers allies.

Salonika

The British and French had been in Salonika since 1915. The Germans called Salonika the only POW camp in which the prisoners paid their own keep. This was nearly true, however the Allies were also preventing Bulgaria from Joining the other Central Powers. At the beginning of 1918, the Allied troops in Salonika were prepared for a major offensive intended to end the war in the Balkans. The Greek Army had been reorganised and joined the Allied force. The offensive began in July 1918, but the British contingent did not play a significant part until early September. Then the British attacked a series of fortified hills in a diversionary attack. The final assault began along the whole front on 15 Sep 1918; the British being engaged in the Lake Doiran area. This Battle was really on the 18th and 19th September 1918 and was a disaster for the British Divisions. They had to frontally assault 'Pip Ridge' which was a 2000 foot high heavily defended mountain ridge with fortresses built on some of the higher mountains, notably Grand Couronne. (This was what the Bulgarians had been working on in the first months of 1916 and early 1917.) They sustained very heavy casualties. The whole attack was in fact a tactical defeat, no troops could have captured the Bulgarin position.But they had suceeded in prevented  the Bulgarins reinforcing the other wing.  However the pressure of the French and Serbs on the other wing broke through, forcing the Bulgarians to retreat. Harried by British Cavalry and swarms of RAF aircraft.

The battle honour Duiran was given to 22 British Infantry Battalions and a yeomanry regiment. The Cheshire Regt, the South Wales Borderers and the Argyls were awarded the French Croix de Guere.

After the battle the demoralized Bulgarians asked for a amistice. On the 30th September 1918 the Armistice came into force

 

Italy

There were 5 British Divisions integrated into the Italian Army Two armies the 6th and 10th had a British Corps. The 10th a British Commander Lord Cavan. Britain also provided the bulk of the Heavy Artillery and also the RAF provided the main air support air support.

The British Divisions were instrumental in stopping the final Austro-Hungarian attack at Asigo with heavy Hungarian losses.

The final two battle in the Italian campaign The British were used as assault troops At the Battle of Piave, The British after a water bourne assault captured the Island of Popadopali. The next assault was across the other half of the River Piave. This time the assault divisions swam the river, Many British soldiers were drownded in the attack. The battle of Vittoria Veineto was complete success. The heavy Guns and RAF creating cahos among the retreating Enemy.

The average strength of the British army in Italy was 75,000 it suffered 6000 casualties.

The Austro Hungarians sued for peace and the armistice came into effect on the 3 November 1918 at 1500 hrs .

 

Middle East

The British Army was fighting in Palestine and in Mesopatamia. It was however a battle in Palestine that brought an end to the war in the middle east.

 

Following the British success in capturing Jerusalem in December 1917 further progress north was effectively stalled in the face of strengthened German forces until September 1918. In part this was because troops had been hastily transferred to the Western Front in March 1918 to assist in the Allies' defence against the German Spring offensive.

Thus on 18 September Sir Edmund Allenby - British regional Commander-in-Chief launched the Battle of Megiddo at Rafat. This set in trail an unbroken series of victories including those at Damascus and Beirut (the latter seized by a French fleet). It was in light of these overwhelming victories that Turkey sued for an armistice of surrender, which was duly agreed on 30 October 1918 in Mudros. British forces subsequently took possession of Constantinople on 10 November 1918.

Reproduced below is the text of Allenby's official report on fighting at Megiddo, dated 20 September 1918.

 

General Allenby's Report on Fighting at Megiddo, 20 September 1918

Our left wing, having swung around to the east, had reached the line of Bidieh, Baka, and Messudiyeh Junction, and was astride the rail and roads converging at Nabulus.

Our right wing, advancing through difficult country against considerable resistance, had reached the line of Khan-Jibeit, one and one-fourth miles northeast of El-Mugheir and Es-Sawieh, and was facing north astride the Jerusalem-Nabulus road.

On the north our cavalry, traversing the Field of Armageddon, had occupied Nazareth, Afule, and Beisan, and were collecting the disorganized masses of enemy troops and transport as they arrived from the south. All avenues of escape open to the enemy, except the fords across the Jordan between Beisan and Jisr-ed-Dameer were thus closed.

East of the Jordan Arab forces of the King of the Hejaz had effected numerous demolitions on the railways radiating from Deraa, several important bridges, including one in the Yurmak Valley, having been destroyed. Very severe losses have been inflicted on the masses of Turkish troops retreating over the difficult roads by our air services.

A German airplane, later ascertained to have been carrying mails, landed in the midst of our troops at Afule. The pilot, who believed the place still to be in Turkish hands, destroyed the machine and its contents before he could be secured.

Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. VI, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923

On the 9th November 1918 the Turkish Empire surrendered on the Gallipoli penninsular

 

So the British apart from capturing more German POWs, Artillery pieces, and Machine Guns than all the rest of the allies put together. They had also been the main driving force in defeating the rest of the Central Powers

 


Reply
 Message 35 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameCurliestJimbertSent: 4/24/2007 1:00 PM
World War I: Battle of Hamel
Before he could launch his innovative assault on German-held Hamel, Australian Lt. Gen. John Monash had to prevail against American General John J. Pershing.

By Peter Nunan

The aggressive German spring 1918 offensive created a bulge in the British line that encompassed the French village of Hamel, near Amiens, on April 4. As a result, Allied troops were exposed to German observers and enfilading fire. In June the Allies made plans to retake Hamel, a move that would strengthen their position and improve the artillery situation. That attack would also showcase the Australian Corps and the innovative tactics of its commander, Lieutenant General John Monash.

Appalled at the horrific casualties and "ghastly inefficiency" of World War I combat, Monash, a 53-year-old former engineer from Melbourne, adopted the view that the infantry's role was "not to expend itself upon heroic physical effort," but "to advance under the maximum possible array of mechanical resources, in the form of guns, machine guns, tanks, mortars, and aeroplanes...to the appointed goal." Monash became an advocate of the use of combined arms operations, including those that employed tanks. Tanks were still in the early stages of development, however. Their crews were unskilled, and their employment had thus far been clumsy. Although the British had first introduced the tank in combat in September 1916, early models had been disappointing.

In the summer of 1918, however, the introduction of the new Mark V tanks -- faster, more agile, better armed and crewed than the Mark IVs -- promised Monash the possibility of a less costly victory. Monash believed that detailed planning and coordination could yield success. "A perfected modern battle plan is like a score for an orchestral composition," he wrote, "where the various arms and units are the instruments, and the tasks they perform are their respective musical phrases. Every individual unit must make its entry precisely at the proper moment, and play its phrase in the general harmony."

Monash faced manpower problems for the coming assault. Battle casualties, the deadly influenza epidemic of 1918 and a drop in recruiting levels in Australia had depleted the infantry section of his "orchestra." Monash therefore needed a strategy that would use manpower sparingly. But he had two important assets to work with -- the new generation of better-engineered tanks and an infusion of troops from the United States.

Monash had a reputation for devising unusual tactics and planning operations in precise detail. The Hamel action was to be no exception. On June 21, he submitted his meticulously worked out proposal for a dawn attack by elements of the Australian Corps' 4th, 6th, 7th and 11th brigades under the 4th Division's Maj. Gen. Ewan Sinclair-McLaglan, to his superior, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commander of the British Fourth Army. The operation also called for the use of some newly arrived American troops. Rawlinson approved it forthwith. He agreed that the Americans -- though not experienced -- could boost Monash's numbers and, in carrying out his battle plan, they could gain valuable experience alongside the more seasoned Australian infantry, or "Diggers." Monash immediately requested about 2,000 men.

On June 27, Maj. Gen. George W. Read's II Corps of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) advised the 33rd Division's Maj. Gen. George Bell, Jr., that "participation...in a raid of some kind...is approved...[and] is considered valuable training." Early on June 30, one month after arriving in France, C Company of the 131st Infantry joined the 42nd Battalion from Queensland, while E Company reinforced the South Australian 43rd Battalion. Companies A and G of the 132nd Infantry reported to the 13th Battalion from New South Wales and the Queensland 15th Battalion, respectively.

The American companies, each numbering about 250 troops, were welcome. The Australian 42nd Battalion, 1,027 strong when it landed in France in November 1916, had only 433 men in June 1918. The 43rd, with 41 officers and 575 troops, incorporated a platoon from the 131st Infantry's E Company in each of its four companies.

The Americans were most appreciative of the warm reception the Diggers gave them. Captain W. Masoner of G Company reported that the 15th Battalion's Colonel T. McSharry "guided us to a Reserve Trench...and remained...until all men found sleeping places and dugouts." "The men were fed very well," added Captain J. Luke of E Company.

Later that day, the rest of the 131st's 1st and 2nd battalions, with stretcher-bearers, intelligence personnel and other specialists, joined the Australian 4th and 11th brigades. American battalion and company commanders eagerly shadowed their veteran Australian counterparts. Following standard Australian practice, about 50 troops from each company were sent to the rear as a reserve in case of heavy attrition. The rest settled in along the front line and got acquainted with their Aussie comrades in arms. Armorer Sergeant Bob Melloy of Kangaroo Point admired Chicago-born Sergeant Lee Lawless' safety razor, the first he had ever seen, and was duly presented with one. During another war more than 20 years later, Major Melloy returned the favor when he acquired more than 4,000 Queensland properties for American forces in Australia, including headquarters for General Douglas MacArthur.

Mutual respect quickly grew. The Americans' commander had exhorted his troops, saying, "you're going into action with some mighty celebrated troops guaranteed to win and you've got to get up to their level and stay with them." The Yanks, in turn, soon impressed the Diggers with their modesty and keenness to learn as they practiced with Lewis light machine guns and grenades and began operating the Mark V tanks. Australian correspondents observing the Americans remarked that it felt as if "we had been walking among ghosts...of the old 1st [Australian] Division," and that "they swear a little less, they drink coffee rather than tea," but otherwise "might as well be our own fellows." The 14th Battalion's historian added that "their presence also had a most stimulating effect. Instead of the grim, set faces usually noticeable prior to battle, our men were all smiles and laughter, and determined to show the newcomers what Australians were capable of on the battlefield."

On July 2, two days before the counteroffensive was scheduled to begin, Monash arranged for the popular Australian prime minister, Billy Hughes, to address some troops from each brigade, taking care that Hughes' visit would not disrupt preparations for the coming "show." Then Monash's planning hit a serious snag. During a visit to the U.S. II Corps headquarters, the AEF commander, General John J. Pershing, learned of the plan to commit American troops to the assault on Hamel and advised General Read that they should not participate. The next day, he telephoned with "further and positive instructions...that our troops should be withdrawn." Pershing believed it was better if American troops fought together rather than as scattered units among the Allied armies. He also wanted assurance that they were fully trained before committing them in offensive actions.

Early on July 3, Pershing's order to withdraw reached six of the 10 U.S. Army companies attached to the Australian Corps. The troops reacted with disappointment. Two Americans in the 42nd Battalion donned Queenslanders' tunics and stayed. The rest dutifully obeyed the order. The Americans' departure at that late juncture hurt Monash's meticulous plan badly because it required reorganizing Australian units -- the 16th Battalion's strength was halved, and the 11th Brigade's manpower dropped from 3,000 to 2,200 soldiers.

Then, at 4 p.m. on the day before the battle, Monash received an order from Rawlinson's headquarters calling for the withdrawal of all Americans. By 5 p.m., Monash had confronted his commander and insisted that the remaining four companies were essential. Pershing's order came too late, he said, and unless Rawlinson absolutely insisted that Pershing's order to withdraw all Americans by 6:30 p.m. be carried out, he intended to proceed as planned -- using the Americans. Monash's demand threatened to put Rawlinson at loggerheads with the American command. There could be serious consequences.

"You don't realize what it means," Rawlinson said. "Do you want me to run the risk of being sent back to England? Do you mean it is worth that?"

"Yes, I do," replied Monash. "It is more important to keep the confidence of the Americans and Australians in each other than to preserve even an Army commander."

Rawlinson, knowing that Monash was a talented officer, decided to back his corps commander if Marshal Sir Douglas Haig did not countermand the decision by 7 p.m. As it happened, Haig called just before 7, and he turned out to be very helpful. Citing the importance of the assault, he resolved the matter, saying, "The attack must be launched as prepared, even if a few American detachments cannot be got out before zero hour."

Monash, who had planned the opening action to occur before daylight, went to bed early. In the early morning hours of July 4, his artillery commander, Brigadier W.A. Coxen, saw him pacing the drive. When the opening barrage thundered out, Monash looked toward the front, then turned to his office.

Monash's plan called for capturing the town of Hamel, the woods near Hamel and Vaire, and the spur beyond, entailing an advance on a six-kilometer front to a depth of about three kilometers in the center, tapering to one kilometer in the south.

The essence of Monash's combined operations strategy was to infiltrate his men and equipment close enough under cover of darkness to use heavy weaponry against the targeted areas, then employ tanks as a cover for the advancing infantry. If the artillery did its job, the infantry's task would devolve into a mop-up operation. Monash's plan also called for extensive use of reconnaissance aircraft so that he could direct troop movements quickly and effectively.

Monash's top intelligence officer had rightly estimated Hamel's defenders at about 3,000 troops. He assessed them as being for the most part of indifferent quality and located in poor defensive positions. There were some exceptions, however, including strongpoints at an installation called Pear Trench, in the northern sector of the targeted area around Hamel, and scattered areas where he expected serious resistance in parts of the woods and in the village. Those observations were incorporated into intense planning sessions that Monash had organized involving all levels of his command, from corps to battalion. The final session, conducted in secrecy on June 30, included 250 officers and resolved 133 items on a detailed planning agenda. The action, involving aircraft, tank corps, artillery and infantry, each with an assigned role, was to be tightly controlled from the very beginning.

In the trenches, the 42nd Battalion enjoyed a hot meal at about 11 p.m. as they listened to 144 Allied aircraft dropping more than 1,100 bombs on Hamel -- an initial softening-up operation. Meanwhile, cloaked by darkness and the noisy uproar of the aircraft, the tanks began their three-mile move from sheltered positions in woods and orchards to their attack positions. Between midnight and 1:45 a.m., the infantry followed the treadmarks of the tanks that had broken through the wire barriers -- an easier task for Americans in their canvas leggings than for Australians in their cloth puttees. By 3 a.m., the troops -- who hailed from Illinois and every province of Australia -- had been issued rum and were in position, ready to attack.

Harrassing artillery fire kicked in at 3:02 a.m. For several weeks previously, Monash had ordered that high explosives, smoke bombs and poison gas shells be fired toward the target at about that time, a tactic intended to condition the defenders to regularly expect a barrage -- and make them think that the smoke masked the presence of gas. This time, however, Monash purposely omitted the gas, making it possible for his troops to move forward safely under cover of smoke and noise.

At 3:10 a.m., 313 heavy guns and 326 field artillery pieces, joined by mortars and more than 100 Vickers machine guns, produced a barrage worthy of the Fourth of July, while the tanks gunned their engines for the half-mile dash. A mix of 10 percent smoke, 40 percent high-explosive and 50 percent shrapnel shells fell 200 yards ahead of the infantry, while larger shells landed 400 yards farther ahead.

The infantrymen rose and moved forward. In four minutes, the artillery adjusted its range 100 yards farther ahead, and the infantry advanced in the wake of the covering fire.


Reply
 Message 36 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameCurliestJimbertSent: 4/24/2007 1:04 PM
Battle of Hamel
 

Captain Carroll M. Gale's C Company, accompanying the Australian 42nd Battalion, followed the barrage, advancing 100 yards every three minutes. His troops came within 75 yards of the exploding shells without sustaining any casualties, but other units were not so fortunate. One squad from E Company and an American section attached to the 15th Battalion lost 12 men killed and 30 wounded because shells fell short of their target. The 15th then hung back while survivors of Lieutenant R. Canaway's 43rd Battalion moved between the barrage and those shells that were falling short.

Advancing into the barrage proved costly to some other Americans as well. After their officers became casualties, three platoons attached to the 13th Battalion were guided to safer ground by Australian NCOs. When Sergeant F.J. Darke saw an American officer wounded by the shelling, he took over his platoon and turned it back from the barrage, and Corporal M.J. Roach was mortally wounded while extricating another U.S. platoon from danger.

The mist, smoke and dust cut pre-dawn visibility down to 20 yards and slowed the tanks. The barrage had overshot Pear Trench, located near the start tapes -- white tapes that had been placed to mark the starting positions -- leaving its wire intact. Consequently, German machine guns raked oncoming infantry, but their return fire was formidable. A typical Australian rifleman carried 200 rounds and two grenades; signalers and runners had 100 rounds each. Specialized troops called bombers added 100 rounds to the eight grenades they carried. A platoon's main punch, however, came from Lewis light machine-gun teams who could fire 500 rounds per minute and who carried 18 magazines of 97 rounds each.

One such team, from the 15th Battalion, silenced an enemy machine-gun post. Then the team's "second member," Private Harry Dalziel from Irvinebank, Queensland, spotted another German machine-gun nest as it opened fire. Dashing toward it, revolver in hand, he killed or captured the gun's crew, allowing the Australians in front of it to proceed with their advance. Although the tip of Dalziel's trigger finger had been shot off, he ignored an order to retire and continued to serve his gunner until Pear Trench was secured. When again ordered to report to the aid post, Dalziel instead elected to bring up ammunition. While he was doing so, a bullet smashed his skull. Miraculously, he did not die. He was transferred to Britain for treatment and later received the Victoria Cross from King George V.

During another firefight, this time in the woods, German machine guns in the so-called Kidney Trench killed the 16th Battalion's company commander, his sergeant major and one of its Lewis gunners, stalling the battalion's advance. From the flank, Lance Cpl. Thomas Leslie "Jack" Axford, a former brewery worker from Kalgoorlie who already had won the Military Medal, grenaded and bayoneted 10 Germans, captured six of them, tossed their machine guns out of their positions, called the stalled platoon to come up and then rejoined his own unit.

Dugouts connected to Kidney Trench yielded 47 more prisoners. Axford was later awarded the Victoria Cross for his "great initiative and magnificent courage."

Six minutes after the operation was launched, the tanks arrived, in accordance with the careful plan of Monash and his tank commander, Maj. Gen. H.J. Elles. Unsupported by heavy artillery and bogged down in mud and barbed wire, the tanks -- intended to provide cover for the infantry -- had failed the Aussies on April 11, 1917, at the Battle of Bullecourt. There, at a village in the center of the Hindenberg line, 10,000 Australians had been killed. With that failure in mind, Monash revised the scenario for Hamel and added some public relations. Using prebattle demonstrations of tank operations, intense rehearsals, joy rides and long persuasive discussions, Monash generated enough of a rapport between infantry and tank crews that many of the British tanks sported Australian battalion colors and names. To allay the infantry's fears that wounded men, hidden by 3-foot-tall field crops, would be crushed by the tanks, Monash issued white tape which could be tied to vegetation or an upturned rifle to mark the wounded soldier's position.

The single most important innovation in tank strategy at Hamel lay in placing the tanks under the control of infantry commanders who could order them to follow closely on the heels of their troops and eliminate enemy strongpoints. Tank commanders also had worries. They protested that advancing so close behind the artillery barrage could expose their 8-foot-8-inch-high vehicles to overhead hits from friendly fire, but they accepted Monash's order, which overruled their objections. As it happened during the course of the battle, some of those objections proved well taken. A third of the attack's armor casualties occurred when an 18-pounder shell fell short and struck a tank attached to 13th Battalion's D Company, killing its guide, Private T. Parrish. In Vaire Wood, Captain G. Marper was wounded by machine-gun fire as he directed a tank carrying his 13th Battalion's colors toward enemy positions. The tank crushed one of the German machine guns under its treads, and the other's crew surrendered.

With combined air, artillery and tank attacks, the 42nd Battalion's assault in the northern flank had met little resistance. Meanwhile, to its south, the 6th Brigade's 21st and 23rd battalions smoothly followed the barrage and the tanks. The southernmost sector was more difficult -- the 25th Battalion suffered 93 casualties. Two platoons were cut down to only eight troops, but Sergeant C.G. Ham led them to take and hold the final objective, for which he was later awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM).

The new strategy yielded many prisoners, starting with the Germans' communication trench in Vaire Wood. When one Digger took a prisoner using the fractured French comment, "Finis la guerre," the German stunned him by laughingly replying, "Yes, my -- -- oath" -- a phrase that demonstrated how well he had learned Australian English while working in the West Australian gold fields before the war.

After passing through the woods, the Australians reached a prearranged halt line and paused 10 minutes to regroup. Thirty tanks were assigned to support the assault on Hamel itself, the third anticipated strongpoint. When stiff resistance was encountered at Notamel Wood, a 43rd Battalion sergeant pulled a tank's rear bell handle. The door opened and he pointed out a troublesome machine-gun position to the tank's crew. The tank crushed it.

No tanks had arrived at the outskirts of Hamel, however, when a brisk fight broke out in front of the village, during which a platoon of the 43rd Battalion under South Australian Lieutenant I. Symons and its attached American platoon killed 15 Germans and captured another 40. When Symons fell wounded, his 21-year-old runner, Private D. Anderson from Broken Hill, took charge of his platoon for the rest of the battle, for which he was subsequently awarded the Military Medal.

By the time another 10-minute halt was called, Hamel lay open, save for some scattered resistance. North of the Pear Trench, a well-placed machine-gun position held up the 43rd Battalion until Australian Corporal F.M. Shaw and Corporal H.G. Zyburt of the 131st rushed it. Firing his Lewis gun from the hip, Shaw advanced 200 yards and enabled Zyburt to get into the position, where he bayoneted three of the gunners. Shaw shot an officer who rushed him. Then, finding his Lewis magazine empty, he hit another German on the head with his revolver. When that failed to stop his assailant, Shaw shot him. A total of eight Germans were killed, the rest surrendered and two previously captured Australians were freed.

When the advance resumed, the tanks came fully into their own. Following their commander's dictum, "It is the primary duty of the tanks to save casualties to the Australian infantry," they hugged the barrage, destroying strongpoints with machine guns, canister fire or their treads.

Engaging three machine guns in a quarry near Hamel, Shaw called in a tank. Its machine gun silenced two of the nests, while the 23-year-old farmer from the Yorke peninsula helped take the third, capturing one German officer and 20 soldiers. Why that tall, slow-speaking son of an Adelaide minister didn't become Hamel's third VC recipient was a mystery to his mates. Shaw, who was awarded the DCM, was mortally wounded near Proyart a month later. His American partner, Zyburt, was awarded the Military Medal.

While the 43rd Battalion cleared Hamel, the 13th, 15th, 42nd and 44th battalions and their accompanying tanks pushed on to their objectives farther east. The remaining battalions had already reached theirs.

Success signals flowed to the rear by pigeon, lights, rockets, telephone and radio. Signalers maintained communications throughout the battle, while special squads confused the enemy by contradicting any German flare with the opposite color.

Monash, who had calmed his nerves by sketching the prime minister's chauffeur, learned that he had won his victory 93 minutes after the push began -- three minutes past the planned timetable. Their objectives won, the Allies promptly began consolidating their gains, improving German trenches and digging new ones. At the now exposed Vaire Wood, Diggers found and occupied some of the craters that had been specially made for Allied defensive positions by 9.2-inch howitzer shells during June. Their positions were plotted and issued on maps to the troops. Three RE-8s of No. 3 Squadron, Australian Flying Corps (AFC), flew over the new front lines, taking 108 photographs. Supplies, previously brought forward by men or mules over dangerous, exposed ground, now reached Hamel via carrier tanks or were dropped from aircraft. Every soldier had carried water bottles, two days' food and a ground sheet, with riflemen also carrying three empty sandbags and a pick or shovel. Now, under Monash's orders, four carrier tanks -- each with an infantry NCO and four unloaders -- did resupply work that would otherwise have required 1,200 men. The results were astonishing for the time. When the 13th Battalion's colonel reached his dump site, he found 34 coils of barbed wire and pickets, 50 tins of water, 150 mortar rounds, 10,000 small-arms rounds, 20 boxes of grenades and 45 sheets of corrugated iron -- a 41Ž2-ton load -- neatly stacked, with the carrier tank already back in the rear.

In hindsight, some thought the carrier tanks were the greatest innovation at Hamel. Each of the fighting tanks also carried a load of supplies -- a 1,200-round box of ammunition, 24 Lewis gun magazines and water for the infantry.

Monash's plan also added some new roles to the AFC's repertory. At 4:40 a.m. on July 5, RE-8s of No. 3 Squadron flew low, tooting horns that signaled the Diggers to light flares in their trenches so the planes' observers could mark the new front line on maps -- maps that were dropped at 4th Division headquarters 10 minutes later.

The two-seaters of No. 9 Squadron, Royal Air Force (RAF), delivered nearly 120,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, dropping them by parachute from boxes fitted under the wings to marked sites along the line. That innovation -- inspired by a captured German document -- had been developed by Captain Lawrence J. Wackett and Sergeant W. Nicholson and his mechanics at No. 3 Squadron, AFC. Townsville-born Wackett, who would later found the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation, received a British grant of 300 pounds sterling for inventing the release gear and cases for the ammunition and parachutes.

Other aircraft strafed and bombed German positions, and except for a half hour in the late morning, the Allies maintained air superiority with the loss of only two planes. Lieutenants A.E. Grigson and H.B. James of No. 3 Squadron AFC shot down one enemy fighter that tried to interfere with their work, and drove another down out of control. Lieutenants D.F. Dimsey and F.J. Mart shot down a Pfalz D.IIIa that was attacking another RE-8.

All but three British tanks reached their objectives, and their crews suffered only 13 casualties. Most of the tanks joined Australian and American infantrymen in scouting and neutralizing remaining pockets of resistance before departing for the rear at 5:30 p.m., some carrying cheering infantrymen who had been wounded.

The Germans sniped at the new Allied positions, and groups of Diggers and doughboys moved up 400 yards in an effort to deal with them. By 7 a.m. next morning, 700 more prisoners had been flushed out of the village and the woods. Lance Corporal Schulz of the 43rd Battalion's Intelligence Section and two German-speaking Americans followed a cable trace that Schulz had noticed in an aerial photograph. Their search was rewarded when they unearthed a dugout and captured a German battalion commander and his staff of 26.

Except for a brief air attack and some shelling, the German response on July 5 was slight. Then, at about 10 p.m., the Germans bombarded with high-explosive and gas shells, after which storm troopers and 200 infantrymen drove a 200-yard wedge between the 44th Battalion's A and B companies east of the village. Four hours later the 44th, augmented by Australians and Americans of the 43rd Battalion, counterattacked. Not only did they regain the lost ground, they recovered 11 out of 15 Australians captured in the German assault. National Guardsman Corporal A. Thomas Pope of E Company, 131st Infantry, rushed an enemy machine-gun position alone, bayoneted its crew and held off the enemy until help arrived.

The night's action cost the Germans 30 troops killed and 50 men and 10 machine guns captured. The 43rd Battalion later presented the gun Pope had captured to his regiment.

Taking and securing Hamel cost the Allies a total of 1,400 casualties, including 39 Americans killed and 196 wounded. The Germans lost more than 2,000 men, including 43 officers and 1,562 enlisted men captured, together with two anti-tank machine guns, a new .53-caliber anti-tank rifle, 32 trench mortars and 177 machine guns. In addition, the Allies recovered 73,000 rounds of British ammunition and boxes of grenades lost when the Germans had first taken Hamel in April. On top of that, the Aussies of the 21st Battalion enjoyed coffee that was mistakenly dropped into their lines by a German airplane.

On July 5, a highly gratified Monash publicly thanked General Bell and praised the "dash, gallantry and efficiency" of the four American companies, concluding that "soldiers of the United States and Australia should have been associated for the first time in such close cooperation on the battlefield is an historic [event] of such significance that it will live forever in the annals of our respective nations."

When Company A was withdrawn to rejoin the AEF on the night of July 5, the 13th Battalion's historian noted that the Aussies "really felt like [they were] losing old comrades." At 5 a.m. the next morning, following a breakfast of Aussie stew and a series of speeches and cheers, the doughboys of Company E, some wearing the 43rd Battalion's colors, also departed, leaving the South Australians feeling, as one of them put it, "very proud of our victory and our Yankee pals."

The Americans were grateful for the experience. Captain Gale spoke for many of them when he said that "more real good was done...by this small operation with the Australians than could have been accomplished in months of training behind the lines." As for Pershing, in his memoir My Experiences in the World War, he described the American participation at Hamel as "somewhat of a surprise," and though the "behavior of our troops was splendid....Its [the battle's] immediate effect was to cause me to make the instructions so positive that nothing of the kind could occur again."

Later, at Moulliens-au-Bois on August 12, Pershing watched King George V award the DCM to Corporal Tom Pope and two other doughboys for their valor at Hamel while four others got the Military Cross and 11 received the Military Medal. Later still, in Luxembourg on April 22, 1919, Pershing himself would present Pope with the Medal of Honor.


Reply
 Message 37 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameArnie-113Sent: 4/24/2007 9:30 PM
Jimbert
 
Two very good messages. It shows that given proper training that the AEF would have turned to be as good as any troops in France.
 
But remember that it was an Australian who said after the battle of St Quinten . That the 'Sammies ( AEF)) were a bloody nuisance and we lost a lot of men saving the fools who had got cut off@
 
Arnie

Reply
 Message 38 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameArnie-113Sent: 4/27/2007 3:53 PM

We have heard a lot about the inexperienced AEF, They were not the only inexperienced soldiers at this time The British 3rd Army's Commanded by Lt Gen Byng, attack on Bapaume was distinguished by the age of many of Byng's men.The following is an extract from Malcom Brown's ' The Imperial War Museum Book of 1918 Year of Victory

Battle of Bapoume

"Meanwhile Sir Julian Byng’s Third Army, was showing its paces to the north of Albert, and in a way only possible in 1918. German intelligence forwarded to the local commander offered �?in the words of another distinguished historian of 1918, Barrie Pitt �?‘the curious, and to him heartening discovery: fifty per cent of Byng’s infantry could well be described as "boys" �?and undernourished ones at that, for they consisted largely of those troops hastily rushed out to France after a most inadequate training, in response to the emergencies created by the St Quentin and Lys Battles. For many of them this was, in fact, their first taste of action.�?Pitt’s account continues:

<DIR>

Thus encouraged, the Germans brought up close reserves and launched one of their more aggressive counter-attacks �?which ran into point-blank fire from the field artillery, then arriving on the scene with a fortunate but unusual timeliness. Despite heavy casualties, the counter-attack was pressed until it was finally broken �?and indeed, flung back �?by the unyielding defence of the ‘boys�? who had had time by now to dig themselves in and who were armed, not only with an adequate supply of machine guns, but also with their own ignorance augmented by an as yet unshaken faith in their leaders. By nightfall the Germans were back in their own lines leaving their dead to litter the battlefield, and feelings of considerable satisfaction to hearten their enemies

</DIR>

The ‘Byng Boys was the name these young men took for themselves, and they wore the title like a badge of pride Claiming rather more expertise and sophistication than the description above allows them, one of them would later write We were young, we were very fit, we had been trained and now we were quite acclimatized in spirit to a war in which death was a general expectation and the loss of a limb was counted a lucky escape.�?They had also acquired very rapidly the standard Tommy attitude to what was generally known as a Blight one�?‘A wound that would take one back to dear old Blight was always an occasion for congratulations from one’s comrades.�?The author of these comments, then Corporal F J Hedges of the 10th Lancashire Fusiliers �?in a book published seventy years later under the apt title Men of 18 in 1918 �?would

<DIR>

- quote with obvious satisfaction the verdict of an official account of this action The "Boys" having been now "blooded" fought like veterans

</DIR>

Also with the Third Army at this time; newly moved to its IV Corps, were the veterans of the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division Captain Harold Horn; Royal Marines, noted the following in his diary on 25th August (in an entry showing how near they had now got to the next prime target-town of Bepaum)

<DIR>

5.30 a.m. Battalion attacked enemy positions in front of and in the village of Le Barque, 2 miles SW of Bapaume on the main Became-Albert road The final objective was reached at 6 50 am and the position immediately consolidated This operation resulted in the capture of 1200 prisoners, 2 trench mortars, 6o machine-guns and much material Two enemy counter-attacks were repulsed

</DIR>

The Third Army continued its hard-fought but powerful advance, Bapaume being pocketed by the highly competent New Zealand Division (also part of IV Corps) on the 29th bapaume was entered by the 37th Division on the same day.

Arnie


Reply
 Message 39 of 39 in Discussion 
From: MSN NicknameArnie-113Sent: 5/1/2007 11:31 PM
Tin can
 
You will be pleased to know that by the 11th November 1918 the AEF was holding a longer streach of line than the British. But before you rush to tell us how you finaly won the war, I should mention that the AEF replaced the British in the trenchs so the British could concentrate on preparing for the assault on Germany.
 
Did I mention That the Royal Navy blockade of Germany was probably the single most action that helped defeat the Germans. Plus the germans like the british to a certain extent did not bring adequate rationing until in the Germans case it was to late. This lowered the Morale of the German civilian this in turn affected the German troops passing through the Fatherland from Russia to the Western Front.
 
In the Big German offensive of 1918 their advance was stopped by young soldiers from UK. However they had anoter allies they were the Briytish Quatermasters.In his book "Storm of Steel" Ernst Junger who was a company commander of an elite Sturm Truppen unit, say that when his troops the british quartermasters stores and saw Ham, loaves of white bread, Jam and fruit is troops stopped and refused to advance whilst they looted the British Stores. He tells about experienced officers sat crying at the side of the road because their troops would not obey orders. Concluding 'this was the day when I knew we had lost the war.
 
Arnie

First  Previous  25-39 of 39  Next  Last 
Return to War