The seeds of competitive democracy

The breakdown in civility, the rise of mean-spiritedness, the problem of gridlock, and the spread of political corruption—assuming these things have indeed deteriorated over time-—are not abuses or corruptions of the partisan system. Such developments are the culmination-—the "perfection"—of a system that political scientist Jane Mansbridge refers to as "adversary democracy"¹³ They are the sour fruit inherent in the seeds of competitive democracy. "No two men can be found who may be said to be outwardly and inwardly united," wrote Bahá'u'lláh."¹⁴

These seeds, to be more precise, are the deepest assumptions about human nature and social order that underlie political competition. The first of these assumptions is that human nature is essentially selfish and competitive. The second assumption is that different groups of people will naturally develop different interests, needs, values, and desires, and these interests will invariably conflict. The third assumption is that, given a selfish human nature and the problem of conflicting interests, the fairest and most efficient way to govern a society is to harness these dynamics through an open process of interest-group competition.

Based on these assumptions, it should come as no surprise that the fruits of competitive democracy include the aforementioned breakdown in civility, rise of mean-spiritedness, problem of gridlock and spread of political corruption. These are to be expected if we accept, and enact, such assumptions. In fact, this is the reason why some competitive democracies have set up complex systems of checks and balances in an effort to limit the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of any given interest group. It is also why some competitive democracies have tried to cultivate, within their political systems, codes of civility and ethics intended to restrain the basest expressions of political competition. And this is the reason that most competitive democracies struggle, to this day, to reign in the worst excesses of political competition by experimenting with term limits, campaign finance reforms, and other stopgap measures. Yet none of these efforts fundamentally changes the nature or the fruit of the system, because the fruit is inherent in the system's internal assumptions—its seeds.

To grasp this inherent relationship, consider the market metaphor that is often invoked as a model for political competition. Competitive democracy is generally conceived as a political marketplace within which political entrepreneurs and the parties they incorporate try to advance their interests through open competition.¹⁵ The "invisible hand" of the market allegedly works to direct this competition toward the maximum public benefit. As Lyon explains,

Supporters of party government argue that if one looks at the larger picture and sees the "political market" in which several parties, the media, interest groups, and individuals all interact, democratic needs are served in a kind of mysterious way ... [as though] another "invisible hand" is at work.¹⁶

Within this market model, political parties incorporate around aggregated sets of interests in order to pool their political capital. Contests then determine leadership and control within and between parties—as politicians and parties organize to fight and win elections. The logic of competitive elections, however, ensures that the goal of winning trumps all other values. As Held explains,

Parties may aim to realize a programme of "ideal" political principles, but unless their activities are based on systematic strategies for achieving electoral success they will be doomed to insignificance. Accordingly, parties become transformed, above all else, into means for fighting and winning elections.¹⁷