Middle East Wars: US Involvements from Jefferson to Bush

Ambassador Richard Parker

March 28, 2000

Summary by Paul Dyer

Ambassador Richard Parker, former US ambassador to Algeria, Lebanon, and Morocco, and noted historian on American involvements in Middle East wars, spoke at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies on Wednesday, March 28. Ambassador Parker has published conference volumes on the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Currently, he is researching the confrontation between the US Navy and the Barbary states of North Africa in the early 19th century in the process of writing a diplomatic history of US relations with North Africa. His remarks focused on the confrontation between the US Navy and the Barbary states and establishment of diplomatic ties with these states.

The ambassador opened by noting that North Africa does not play a major role in US foreign policy today, and that the region rarely gains the attention of our popular media. However, North Africa was of major concern to the United States in its early history, primarily due to the importance of the Mediterranean Ocean to our commercial interests.

According to Ambassador Parker, the first diplomatic contact between the United States and North Africa was between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, the respective US representatives in London and Paris, and Abdel Rahman Al-Ajar, a representative of Tripoli, which considered itself "at war" with the United States. The Barbary states, which included Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis and Morocco, were engaged in privateering and raided as far as the coasts of Ireland and Iceland. (At one point, Algerian privateers captured the population of Baltimore, Ireland, and only one of these people ever returned to Baltimore.) The Barbary states considered themselves at war with any country that did not have a peace agreement with them. Abdel Rahman Al-Ajar offered the US representatives such a peace for 30,000 guineas and 3000 pounds for himself, an amount worth $1.75 million in today's terms.

European powers had contended with the Barbary privateers for centuries, and nearly all of them were paying tribute to North African rulers to secure the safety of their fleets. In fact, Parker stated, the British and French were actively encouraging the privateers in order to limit commercial competition by smaller states. Foreign powers also issued slips of protection for other countries' ships, as well as licenses for raiding ships.

While the Moroccans had entered into a permanent treaty with the United States, the other Barbary states continued to insist on regular tributes. Parker stated that the US government agreed to pay Algiers $335,000, and had given them several ships.The total given to the Algerians was $990,000 (today's equivalent would be nearly $14 million), when the total annual revenues for the US government were only $6-7 million. The US government also agreed to pay the bey of Tunis $50,000, but he demanded more on hearing the news of America's payment to the bey of Algiers. The situation was made worse by the capture of 11 American ships in 1793, a situation that was only resolved ten years later with the payment of $585,000 to Algiers. The United States government could not afford to continued making such payments, and finally sent Commander Decatur to impose treaties on the Barbary states by force.

The war with the Barbary pirates lasted four years. According to Ambassador Parker, it marked the United States' first foreign military intervention, as well as its first attempt to interfere with the internal politics of a foreign state. The US fleet attempted to blockade the ports of Tunis and Tripoli. Commander John Rogers blocked Tunis and demanded a peace agreement from the bey, "a great example of diplomacy backed by force." His blockade of Tunis was met by Tunis sending an ambassador to Washington, who secured a letter from Jefferson apologizing to the bey for Rogers' actions. In 1803, William Eaton crossed from Alexandria to Darna with a force of US Marines, Arab tribesmen and some Frenchmen who had stayed in Egypt following Napoleon's invasion. They marched on Tripoli with Ahmad, the governor of Darna and brother of Yusef, the Bey of Tripoli, intending to install Ahmad on the throne in Tripoli. In the meantime, however, the US consul in Tripoli settled with Yusef and the conflict ended.

According to Parker, there is a lesson in the early relations between the US and North Africa. In his view, the US should not encourage people in other countries to attach themselves to us in order to change their internal affairs. The early attempt to change internal politics in Tripoli should serve as a lesson as we look at the attempt to assist the Iraqi opposition with military aid, a move Parker considers "a bad decision."

The analyses and opinions expressed above are solely those of the speaker and should not necessarily be construed as representing those of The Center for Contemporary Arab Studies or its Board of Advisors. All inaccuracies in coverage are the responsibility of the rapporteur.