MG Notes: On 14 July 2006, a Sa'ar V corvette of the Israeli Navy was hit by a Chinese-designed, Iranian-fired C-802 SACCADE anti-ship cruise missile, very similar in design and performance to the U.S. Navy "Harpoon" ASM.  The primary self-defense armament for the Sa'ar V is the vertical launch "Barak" point-defense missile and the Mk 15 "Phalanx" Close-In Weapon System (CIWS).  So, readers are asking: how did the Iranians manage to put a C-802 into the side of Israel's best warship?  There is an answer (later), but first I want to introduce you to the Mk 15 gun system and the C-802 missile.

20-mm Phalanx, Mk 15 Mod. 0 Block 1, 1A, and 1B CIWS (Close-in Weapon System)
Bldr: General Dynamics (with G.E. gun) or Raytheon (ex-General Electric)

Vulcan/Phalanx “Close-in�?system designed to destroy missiles, consisting of a multibarrel, M61A1 20-mm gun co-mounted with two radars, one of which follows the target and the other the projectile stream, using the Mk 90 integrated fire-control system. A computer furnishes necessary corrections for train and elevation so that the two radar returns (target and projectiles) coincide, bringing heavy fire to bear on the target. Only 989 rds were carried in the Block 0 magazine. The first production unit completed 9-8-79. The improved Block 1 version with 1,550 rounds on mount and a higher rate of fire entered service in late 1988—five years late—and all remaining U.S. Navy Phalanx mounts have been converted to Block 1. Originally used Mk 149 projectiles with depleted uranium sub-caliber penetrators; later, heavier nickel-iron rounds were introduced, and 105-gram nickel-cobalt-tungsten rounds with 50% greater penetration are now being phased in. As of 10-02, more than 850 mounts had been produced for 21 nations.

Block 1A Phalanx substituted an improved computer to improve capabilities against rapidly maneuvering targets. Block 1B adds a Pilkington Optronics IR imaging and tracking system to the mount; eleven update kits have been ordered for use on  Oliver Hazard Perry–class frigates, and more may be procured for amphibious warfare ships and Phalanx-equipped DDG 51–class destroyers. Other modifications to Block 1B include: low-sidelobe modification to the tracking radar; a tunable narrow-band filter added to the search radar; substitution of longer gun barrels (480 mm -- 18.9 inches longer) on the pneumatic-drive guns; electric controls; and improved, sturdier supports for the gun to reduce dispersion. Raytheon began delivering Block 1B new mounts from a Louisville, Kentucky, facility in 1999, and the first production mount was placed on FFG 50 in 9-00. On 22-10-02, Raytheon received a contract to modify 16 Block 1 mounts to Block 1B configuration, plus four conversion kits for the U.S. Navy. Data for the Block 1B system include:

  Mount weight: 5.4 tons

  Rate of fire: 3,000 rds/minute (Block I: 3,000 or 4,500/min.)

Below: A Mk 15 Mod 0, Block 1A CIWS firing at an air target.  The white structure above the gun crade is the radome that contains the search and fire control radar.  These are slaved together with the on-board fire control computer (closed-loop) to put the third round out of the barrel on the target.

Above: The Mk 15 Mod 0, Block 1B CWIS.  Note the barrel clamp on the longer barrels, electro-optical sights on the radome, and the extra support for the rotating barrel cluster.

Below: An Israeli Sa'ar V corvette showing its various systems and features.  The Sa'ar V is designed have a very low (stealthy) signature for visual, radar, sonar, and infra-red targeting systems.

Above:  A C-802 SACCADE with its booster attached.  This missile is very similar to the U.S. Navy "Harpoon" anti-ship missile.

Below:  A C-802 anti-shipping missile is fired from its mobile TEL (transporter, erector, launcher).  Note that the wings are folded as it emerges from the cell.  These erect themselves and the solid propellant rocket motor booster pushes the missile to flying speed for the turbojet to continue flight.  The spent booster is jettisoned at burn-out.

Specifications
Contractor	CHETA - China Hai Yang [Sea Eagle] Electro-Mechanical Technology - CASC 3rd Academy
Entered Service
Total length	6.39 m; (5.16 m without booster)
Diameter	0.36 m
Wingspan	1.18 m
Weight	715 kg; (530 Kg not including booster)
Warhead Weight	165 kg HE-Armor Piercing
Propulsion	one French Microturbo jet engine, one solid booster
Maximum Speed	0.85 Mach
Maximum effective range	15 to 120 km
Guidance mode	active radar with ECCM features
Single-shot hit	85%

The Ying Ji-802 land attack and anti-ship cruise missile [Western designation SACCADE], is an improved version of the C-801 which employs a small turbojet engine in place of the original solid rocket engine. The weight of the subsonic (0.9 Mach) Ying Ji-802 is reduced from 815 kilograms to 715 kilograms, but its range is increased from 42 kilometers to 120 kilometers. The 165 kg. (363 lb.) warhead is just as powerful as the earlier version. Since the missile has a small radar reflectivity and is only about five to seven meters above the sea surface when it attacks the target, and since its guidance equipment has strong anti-jamming capability, target ships have a very low success rate in intercepting the missile. The hit probability of the Ying Ji-802 is estimated to be as high as 98 percent. The Ying Ji-802 can be launched from airplanes, ships, submarines and land-based vehicles, and is considered along with the US "Harpoon" as among the best anti-ship missiles of the present-day world.

 

Following the 1991 Gulf War Iran imported the C-802 anti-ship cruise missile from China. China suspended exports in 1996 in response to complaints by the the United States. In December 1996 Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashivili, warned Chinese Defense Minister General Chi Haotian that arms exports would increase destabilizing factors in the region. No international agreement bans transfers of anti-ship missiles, and the C-802 is not covered by the MTCR, which controls exports of ballistic and cruise missiles that can deliver 500 kg. warheads to 300 km. Iran expected to purchase 150 C-802 missiles from China but only received a half of them because of the arms suspension. By mid-1997 Iran reportedly possessed some 60 of the missiles deployed in coastal batteries on Qeshm Island, a strategic point on the eastern side of the Arabian peninsula. In 1997, General J.H. Binford Peay, Central Command commander, said that China transferred 20 patrol boats with 15 equipped with C-802 missiles (Washington Times, January 29, 1997). [Some reports claim that China may have transferred hundreds of C-802s, although these claims are not widely attested].

 

In early 2000 it was reported that North Korea and Iran were jointly developing an advanced version of the C-802 cruise missile. These missiles initially acquired by Iran were not equipped with advanced systems, and the missiles acquired by Iran were rather outdated. Iran turned to North Korea for missile system technology, and the two countries are jointly developing an upgraded version with improved accuracy. ["North Korea, Iran Jointly Develop Missile: Report" Korea Times February 17, 2000]

 

MG Notes:  Obviously, the Mk 15 CIWS and the C-802 missiles are very deadly in their intended roles.  The ship platform for the Mk 15 CIWS is state-of-the-art.  How could such an attack succeed?  Early indications from Israeli sources are showing a pattern of overconfidence and unawareness of their system's limitations and weaknesses on both the part of the Navy and the Israeli Air Force.

 

As stated before the Barak VLS is one of two primary weapons designed to counter cruise and anti-ship missiles; the other is the Mk 15 CIWS.  The CIWS is the "last-ditch" defense in case the in-bound missile -- "Vampire" in Naval terminology -- is about to hit the ship.  The Sa'ar V has a integrated combat system to protect it, but although it is integrated into the overall system, the Mk 15 CIWS is also a stand-alone in it is designed to function independently of the ship's system, if necessary, to protect the ship.

 

As stated, the CIWS has a search and fire control radar with closed loop spotting to put projectiles on target.  The following is a typical engagement scenario.  One, the CIWS is operating in automatic (computer drives engagement decisions).  Two, the following conditions exist: (1) in-bound target on a collision or intercept course, (2) target is traveling at subsonic or supersonic speed, and (3) target is closing at low altitude (100 to 50 feet) above the water and trying to evade radar in sea clutter.

 

The Mk 15 search radar rotates at 90 rpm and picks up the in-bound at 5 miles.  The computer assesses the threat and prioritizes it.  The fire control radar locks-on.  As soon as the in-bound target crosses the 2 mile threshold, the gun opens fire.  The fire control radar tracks the out-bound 20mm projectiles and the computer generates gun train and elevation orders to bring the third 20mm round on the target.  The target is "killed" when: (1) its warhead detonates (a "hard" kill) or (2) it undergoes an abrupt speed change that indicates target break-up from aerodynamic forces (a "soft" kill).  When the kill is made, the gun will automatically engage the second priority target (if any).  That is the way it is SUPPOSED to work.  Why didn't it?

 

Here is what we know from open sources (including Israeli reports). 

 

Israeli intelligence appears to have been unaware that Iranian C-802 ASM's were in Lebanon.  The Israeli Air Force (IAF) was conducting combat missions over the Lebanese-Israeli border region and there was a lot of friendly air traffic.  The Sa'ar V was close to shore and to prevent friendly fire casualties, had shutdown its primary defensive systems -- including the CIWS.  The crew was not at Condition ONE (battle stations) or relaxed battle stations (Condition ONE -- modified), but were cruising and having their meal when the missile hit without warning.  Four of the crew went missing (Israelis are reporting three of the four confirmed dead).  The explosion was at the waterline, aft by the helo hangar and deck caused fire, flooding, and loss of power.  Effective damage control got the fire and flooding under control.  The Sa'ar V went dead-in-the-water during this time and reports are that she was towed for a brief time by another Israeli vessel until her engineering plant was brought back on-line.  Another missile missed the Sa'ar V and is said to have severely damaged or sunk and Egyptian frieghter.  No casualty reports on the freighter are known at this time.  The Sa'ar V returned to the Israeli base at Ashold on Saturday, 15 July 2006.

 

 

 

What went wrong?  The Israelis were complacent.  The ship was in a high-threat area in which combat operations were being carried out.  The Sa'ar V crew was not at battle stations or relaxed battle stations.  The fear of friendly fire caused the captain to turn his defensive systems OFF.  As a result, the ship took an anti-ship missile that killed four of the crew and rendered the ship -- though it survived and will live to fight another day -- a mission kill and put out of action.

 

Here's what the likely outcome will be.

1.  The captain will be relieved of command and will never be given a ship again.

2.  The rules of engagement will be changed so that the defensive systems will always be ON and ship's company at Condition ONE or ONE modified in high-threat areas.  There may be more missiles fired in the future, but the likelihood of success is now about zero.  The likelihood that the launch site will be destroyed is now about 100%.

3.  The Iranians that pulled this off are now going to be hunted to destruction.

4.  The IAF will be told that it is not to go within three miles of this ship unless they want to be shotdown or to approach in a totally non-threatening manner so as not to provoke a CIWS response.

5.  The IAF E-2C "Hawkeye" AWACS aircraft will be actively looking for any fire control radar emissions and the IAF will destroy them immediately.

6.  Israeli war doctrine is being updated by events.