Author's Note: By nightfall on 2 August 1964, MADDOX had left the area where she engaged the North Vietnamese P-4 torpedo boats T-333, T-336, and T-339. On the other side of the International Dateline, Washington was receiving the latest intelligence on the Tonkin Gulf situation. We pickup the story in Washington, DC on the morning of 2 August 1964.
Morning, 2 August 1964: President Lyndon Johnson meets with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earl Wheeler, and other senior officials of the administration. The group concludes the attack might have resulted from the unilateral actions of an aggressive North Vietnamese boat commander or a local shore command. At the same time, the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] concludes that "information collected reveals that since March the North Vietnamese have become 'increasingly sensitive to incursions from the South and to the threat of extension of the war and bombing.'" DIA further observes that the "torpedo attempt on MADDOX indicates North Vietnamese intent and readiness to take aggressive action if they consider their territory immediately threatened."
President Johnson observes later that "we were determined not to be provocative, nor were we going to run away. We would give Hanoi the benefit of the doubt -- this time -- and assume the unprovoked attack had been a mistake." As the patrol resumes, North Vietnam is informed that U.S. ships will continue to steam where they please in international waters. Further, the North Vietnamese are warned to be "under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against U.S. forces."
1229 Eastern Daylight Time, 2 August 1964: President Johnson orders the JCS to complete the interrupted Desoto Patrol. Admiral Moorer's [CINCPACFLT] route and time changes are accepted. CINCPAC [ADM Sharp] is advised that Desoto ships can approach no closer than 12 nautical miles to the North Vietnamese mainland. Continuous daylight air cover is provided for the ships. Aircraft are stationed east of the two destroyers to avoid the possibility of over-flying Communist territory. ADM Sharp also issues directions to ensure that the patrol avoids approaching the North Vietnamese coast during the period of the next OP PLAN 34A maritime mission.
Early morning hours, 3 August 1964: MADDOX is approaching the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. A little more than two hours after the close of the combat action in the Gulf of Tonkin, ADM Thomas Moorer [CINCPACFLT] orders continuation of the Desoto Patrol. Commander, Pacific Fleet [ADM U.S. Grant Sharp] states that "in view [of the ] MADDOX incident, [I] consider it in our best interest that we assert [the] right of freedom of the seas and resume [the] Gulf of Tonkin patrol [at the] earliest [time].
MADDOX is now joined by TURNER JOY, a destroyer carrying three rapid-fire 5-inch/54-caliber guns, four twin-mounted, 3-inch/50-caliber rapid fire (RF) guns, and advanced fire control systems. CINCPAC [Sharp] alters the previous operational schedule. MADDOX and TURNER JOY are ordered to proceed to Point Charlie, close by Hon Me island, and then move northward toward Point Delta off Thanh Hoa. On 4 August, the destroyers are to retrace their track to Point Charlie. During the next three days, both patrol ships are scheduled to steam through Points Lima, Mike, November, Oscar, and Papa before ending the mission. Both ships have orders to retire to the east for safety at the close of the day.
CINCPACFLT [Moorer] states that the closest point of approach [CPA] to North Vietnam remains eight nautical miles to the mainland and four nautical miles from the off-shore islands. Admiral Sharp [CINCPAC] concurs with COMSEVENTHFLT's [Johnson's] resumption of the patrol and with the changes to the schedule. CINCPAC directs his naval component commander to delay implementation until the JCS give approval. At the same time, CAPT Herrick on MADDOX expresses concerns about reentry into the Gulf of Tonkin, noting: "It is apparent that [the] DRV has thrown down the gauntlet and now considers itself at war with the U.S. It is felt that they will attack U.S. forces on sight with no regard for [the] cost. U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin can no longer assume that they will be considered neutrals exercising the right of free transit. They will be treated as belligerents from first detection and must consider themselves as such."
Herrick also observes that tactical considerations weigh against MADDOX undertaking a renewed patrol: "DRV PT's [patrol torpedo boats] have [the] advantge, especially at night, of being able to hide in junk concentrations all across the Gulf of Tonkin. This would allow [an] attack from short range with little or no warning. Present TURNER JOY gunnery suite [is] not too well-fitted for anti-PT [action] even in daylight. A short hull DD such as MADDOX [is] too short-legged [limited fuel capacity] for [a] long patrol where high speeds are required as in PT evasion. {i} . . . consider the resumption of the patrol can only be safely undertaken by a DD, CL/CA [destroyer, light or heavy cruiser] team and [only[ with continuous air cover."
0822H, 3 August 1964: COMSEVENTHFLT [Johnson] requests that Commander, U.S. Military Advisory Command Vietnam [COMUSMACV], GEN William Westmoreland, provide him with information on the timing of the next OP PLAN 34A mission to preclude interference with the Desoto Patrol. General Westmoreland responds that the Seventh Fleet destroyers should remain clear of the waters generally between the 17th and 18th parallels and stay east of 108 degrees, 20 minutes E during the dates of 3 and 4 August. At the same time, there are no concerns in the Washington intelligence community that the North Vietnamese consider the OP PLAN 34A and Desoto Patrol operations linked as one.
Chief of Naval Operations [CNO] ADM David L Macdonald, advises CINCPACFLT [Moorer] that intelligence reveals "heightened sensitivity and resultant attack by the DRV [on MADDOX] possibly was [the] aftermath of a [reported] attack on Hon Me island; that following this attack, [intelligence] indicated DRV intentions and preparations to repulse further such attacks." Intelligence units in the Pacific inform that on 1 August 1964, the New China News Agency reports North Vietnamese have protested to the International Control Commission [ICC]that at on or about 2340H, on 30 July 1964, the "U.S. and South Vietnamese administrations sent two naval vessels to shell Hon Nieu island [and] Hon Me island." Conclusions are that the tracking and subsequent attack on MADDOX could have been provoked by enemy incursions into the Gulf of Tonkin a day or two before the arrival of MADDOX in the area.
3 August 1964: A CIA bulletin affirms "Hanoi's naval units have displayed incressing sensitivity to U.S. and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during the past few months." MADDOX and TURNER JOY are placed under the operational control of CAPT Herrick as Commander, Task Group 72.1. Herrick is instructed to destroy any enemy that may have attacked MADDOX or TURNER JOY. Admiral Moorer [CINCPACFLT] on TICONDEROGA says that in the event of "another unprovoked attack on the Desoto Patrol, it is mandatory that a maximum effort be made [to] achieve complete destruction of the attacking units." U.S. ships and aircraft are authorized to maintain an alert for enemy vessels which are within the 12-mile coastal zone. If the latter craft attack from those waters or retire there after the action, U.S. ships are not allowed to undertake hot pursuit into the 12-mile zone.
Morning and afternoon, 3 August 1964: The Desoto Patrol steers a northwesterly course toward Point Charlie. The passage is uneventful until 1420H when one of the ships detects apparent radar emissions from a surface vessel. This is an indication that the pair of ships is under surveillance from at least 1637H onwards. An hour later, the Desoto Patrol reaches the vicinity off Point Charlie. They turn north toward Point Delta. Swatow gunboat T-142 shadows the destroyers on the sortie north, periodically reporting to shore stations.
Upon reaching the Point Delta area at 1727H, MADDOX and TURNER JOY turn east and make for the relative safety of a nightime orbit in the open sea. At the same time, a South Vietnamese maritime raiding force has been at sea for one hour and 17 minutes. The four boat group, PTF-1, PTF-5, PTF-2, and PTF-6, is scheduled to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the south bank of the Ron River. The force departs Da Nang at 1610H on the evening of 3 August 1964. Each boat carries an 18-man South Vietnamese crew and a portable 57 millimeter recoilless rifle, in addition to their other weapons. The trip north is uneventful until 1845H, when PTF-2 suffers a mechanical failure 70 miles east of the DMZ, forcing its return to Da Nang. The remaining vessels proceed to a point east of Vinh Son, where they separate and make for their respective targets.
PT-810 (later renumbered PTF-1) crusing in Chesapeake Bay. Powered by four gasoline engines like her sister, PTF-2, she suffered from the same flammabilty and lack of spare parts during her Vietnam service. She and her sister, were retired from service by late 1965. (Photo: U.S. Navy)
Midnight, 3 August 1964: PTF-1 and PTF-5 open fire on the radar facility near Vinh Son for 25 minutes. South Vietnamese fire 770 rounds of 57 millimeter and 40 millimeter fire into the target area.
At 0025H, 4 August 1964: The South Vietnamese boats then withdraw and head for Da Nang, reaching port about 0715H on the morning of the 4th.
At 2352H, 3 August 1964, PTF-6 begins illuminating and shelling the security post in the area of the Ron River with 57mm, 40mm, and 20mm weapons and ignite several fires. The enemy responds with small arms fire that fails to hit the craft.
At 0020H, 4 August 1964: PTF-6 is pursued by an enemy vessel that approaches at 25 knots. PTF-6 speeds south, and arrives in Da Nang at 0625H on the morning of the 4th.
Vietnamese gunners aboard PTF-7 practice 40 mm gun operation and sharpen their shooting skills prior to commencing raids against North Vietnamese targets from Da Nang, RVN in mid-1964. (Photo: OIC of PTF-7)
About 2359, 3 August 1964: Approximately 100 miles from the coast, the Desoto Patrol ships make radar contact with vessels that closely parallel their courses for over an hour. CAPT Herrick strongly suspects the shadow is a Communist bloc patrol craft. The suspected shadow, probably the Swatow gunboat T-142, breaks contact at 0100H, 4 August 1964. During the night of 3 to 4 August 1964, ADM Johnson [COMSEVENTHFLT] suggests the following day's mission be ended. With their radius of action restricted to the 70-mile track between Point Delta and Point Charlie, he notes tha tthe ships will be easy to locate.
Admiral Moorer [CINCPACFLT] does not concur: "[It] . . . does not in my view, adequately demonstrate U.S. resolve to assert our legitimate rights in these internationl waters. [The] . . . ships should patrol the Charlie to Delta track for the next two days, proceed to another point to the north on the third day, and return to the Charlie - Delta track on the fourth day, before departing the Gulf. [I] believe these sorties would demonstrate U.S. determination to continue the patrols, possibly draw the enemy away from the [OP PLAN] 34A activities, and preclude interference beteen the two operations." The JCS agrees with the revised schedule.
At the same time, ADM Sharp [CINCPAC] raises objection to the JCS directives that prohibit the destroyers from approaching closer than 12 miles to the North Vietnamese coastline, even in hot pursuit. Noting his dissatisfaction with the rules of engagement, the Pacific commander observes: "A U.S. ship has been attacked on the high seas off North Vietnam. The MADDOX quite properly repulsed the attackers and one of the attacking boats was destroyed. Now, our friends and enemies alike will await what additional moves the U.S. will take. The JCS directives appear to be a retreat at a time when aggressive measures are necessary."
In response, JCS reaffirms the decision that the Desoto Patrol Ships are barred "from entry into the 12-mile zone, even in hot pursuit." In the event of attack on the patrol, aircraft could retaliate against the attackers in waters up to three miles of the enemy coastline. The Desoto Patrol ships return to the patrol track on the morning of Tuesday, 4 August 1964. CAPT Herrick again expresses his concern for the safety of the U.S. force. The task group commander [Herrick] concludes the DRV considers his patrol directly involved with [OP PLAN] 34A operations. "DRV considers U.S. ships present as enemies because of these operations and have already indicated their readiness to treat us in that category."
Herrick's deputy reports: "CAPT Herrick believes the enemy was especially sensitive about the area around Hon Me [island] because of his concentration of coastal patrol forces there . . . the Captain feels that his ships will be most vulnerable to the enemy at this point . . . the North Vietnamese can hide behind the island and then launch a sudden attack that will be difficult to detect or repulse because of the short distance to the Desoto Patrol track."
0700H, 4 August 1964: Almost seven hours after the PTF force departed their target area of Vinh Son, MADDOX and TURNER JOY turn west toward the North Vietnamese coast, arriving in the vicinity of Point Delta around 1400H. The ships then proceed southwest toward Point Charlie with TICONDEROGA aircraft circling overhead or nearby.
1435H, 4 August 1964: CAPT Herrick reports having been shadowed for the past four hours from a distance of 15 miles by a vessel he believes to be a motor gunboat.
1700H, 4 August 1964: The Desoto Patrol force reaches a position northeast of Point Charlie, changes course to the east, and heads out to sea. At no time does the patrol sail closer than 16 miles to the coast. The North Vietnamese are aware of the passage of the American ships. Late in the afternoon of 4 August 1964, the Swatow gunboats T-142 and T-146 receive orders from Naval Headquarters in Haiphong to prepare for military operations that night. Torpedo boat T-333, one of the P-4's involved in the action on 2 August 1964, also is scheduled to participate in the operation. However, due to an inability to repair her lubricating oil casualty, this unit is not able to deploy.
2040H, 4 August 1964: CAPT Herrick sends a FLASH precedence message stating that he has received infomation indicating an attack by Swatow gunboats and P-4 torpedo boats "imminent" and that the patrol force is "proceeding southeast at best possible speed." The Desoto force is more than 60 nautical miles southeast of Hon Me island at 19 degrees, 107 minutes N; 107 degrees E on a heading of 090 degrees at a speed of 20 knots. MADDOX is using her surface search radar for long-range search and is 1,000 yards ahead of TURNER JOY.
Subsequent to the engagement on the night of 4 August 1964, CDR Ogier reports that contacts dectected on his destroyer's radar were bona fide. Weather and wake contacts were quickly identified as such. Meteorological conditions were particularly good for radar operation. No North Vietnamese junks or fishing craft had sailed that far out to sea after dark, and none was detected that night. Desoto Patrol radar scopes were free of clutter, and Navy radarmen were able to clearly distinguish the enemy fast attack craft. Weather conditions in the Gulf of Tonkin this night included a 10 to 20-knot wind from the southeast and intermittent thunderstorms. Cloud cover at about 2,000 feet. The night was moonless and dark. The sea state was moderate with two to six foot waves.
2041H, 4 August 1964: MADDOX picks up a surface contact at 42 miles northeast in the area where both ships intend to cruise during the night; it is the same position used by the Desoto Patrol on the previous night.
2150H, 4 August 1964: First MADDOX and then TURNER JOY establish a clear radar contact with three surface vessels. CAPT Herrick determines the vessels are patrol craft because their speeds are in excess of 30 knots. The unidentified craft attempt to close with the Desoto Patrol. At the same time, CAPT Herrick orders both U.S. destroyers to change course to the southeast (130 degrees and then 140 degrees) at maximum speed. Fearing a trap, Herrick attempts to open the distance on the threatening contacts. However, the latter vessels turn to intersect the course of the U.S. ships.
2157H, 4 August 1964: Radar on MADDOX determines the three surface craft have joined in close formation about 32 miles from the Desoto Patrol ships. Both U.S. destroyers are now proceeding at 30-knots. Herrick changes his heading more to the southeast (160 degrees). The radar contacts drift out of range and disappear aft.
USS MADDOX cruising off Hawaii about 4-1/2 months before the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Task Group 72.1 commander CAPT Herrick was embarked aboard MADDOX on the night of the second Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 4 August 1964. MADDOX carried three twin 5"/38 cal semi-automatic guns and two twin 3"/50 cal rapid fire (RF) guns. The Primary gun director (Director 51) is located above the bridge; the secondary gun direct (Director 52) is located aft, between the twin 3" guns and ahead of the after 5" gun mount. (Photo: U.S. Navy Historical Society)
2215H, 4 August 1964: MADDOX and TURNER JOY pickup three or four contacts in close formation only 13 miles behind and approaching at 30 knots. Fire control radars of both ships lock-on these contacts. The threatening surface craft close to 23,200 yards. At the same time, MADDOX and TURNER JOY radaes indentify another contact only 9,800 yards due east and approaching at 35 to 40 knots.
2239H, 4 August 1964: When the latter craft (V1) closes to 7,000 yards, TURNER JOY opens fire. MADDOX immediately folows suit. The ships are now at 18 degrees, 17 minutes N; 107 degrees, 32 minutes E. At the same time, the single contact to the east turns to the left and opens the reange. LTjg Frederick Frick, MADDOX watch officer in the Combat Information Center [CIC], evaluates this maneuver, plots and records it on his dead reckoning tracer as a torpedo launch. At the same time, MADDOX sonar reports torpedo noises. CDR Ogier order full right rudder to comb the track of the suspected torpedo and warns TURNER JOY.
Summary plot of MADDOX and TURNER JOY during 4 to 5 August 1964 by U.S. Naval Historical Society.
TURNER JOY immediately comes right on course 210 degrees just as its crewmen spot a torpedo wake. LTjg John Barry, USNR, officer-in-charge of fire control Director 51, high in the ship's superstructure, spies "a distinct wake on the port side about 500 feet from the ship moving from forward on a parallel course to this ship . . . the wake itself appears light in color and just below the surface, rather than anything cutting the water on the surface and that it formed a definite vee in the water." Barry, an experienced ASW [anti-submarine warfare] officer, had seen many actual torpedo wakes prior to the August incidents. The sighting of a torpedo wake 100 to 500 feet to port is corroborated by one of Barry's subordinates, Seaman Larry Litton, by Seaman Roger Berland in fire control Director 52, and by the portside lookout, Seaman Edwin Sentel. The latter reports the information to the bridge. When hostile craft return on an intercept course, two 5-inch mounts on TURNER JOY again take it under fire. Fire control radar indicates that hits are scored.
USS TURNER JOY (DD-951) was part of the Forrest Sherman-class destroyers built in the 1950's for the U.S. Navy. These were the last all gun ships to join the fleet. Some units were converted to carry missiles later in their careers. TURNER JOY carried three 5"/54 cal automatic guns and two twin 3"/50 cal RF guns. Director 51 is located just ahead of the front leg of the tripod mast; Director 52 is located just aft of the second stack. (Photo: U.S. Navy)
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