EXTRACTS No. VIII.

"In regard to the story reported among the Jews, respecting the body of Jesus, I admit there is a greater probability of there being such a report, especially if the body could not be found, and the apostles affirmed that he was risen from the dead, than there is that the resurrection, should be actually true: hence, perhaps, I was not so much on my guard in the expression as I ought to have been. What I particularly had in my mind was, that I might find it difficult to prove even the existence of such a story, i. e. in the days of the apostles; and still more difficult to prove, even on the ground that there was no resurrection, that this story was true; and therefore there could be no use in urging the truth of this story in order to invalidate the truth of the resurrection. I do not conceive, however, that because I doubt the _fact_, I am under obligations to account for the _fallacy_. It always belongs to the advocates of the truth of any story, to bring forward sufficient evidence to prove the same. I can think of a solution, however, that would appear to my understanding much more probable, than to suppose, as mentioned in your seventh article, the 'account written long since the apostles' day;' yet it may, perhaps, be attended with equal or greater difficulties, viz. that the body was not stolen by the apostles, but was taken away by other persons, who were willing that Jesus should be _deified_, according to the then common acceptation of that word among the Greeks, and who studied this stratagem with an express design to deceive the Jews, as a punishment to them for so cruelly putting him to death, and also to deceive his disciples, in order to inhance the honour of the name of Jesus.

"This might have been done, as I conceive, by persons who never became his open followers, so far as to suffer death on his account, but were contented in having gained their object; to do which, it was only necessary in the first instance to frighten the soldiers. It may be difficult after all, as I have observed concerning the human species, to say where the truth of the account ends, or where the fallacy begins; but that some such thing should have taken place is more probable to my understanding than that the literal resurrection of Jesus should have been true. But I perceive that my expression, concerning the report among the Jews, was a little too strong; and carried rather more in it than what I was aware. For even on my hypothesis, as well as on every other which admits the absence of the body, such a report would appear very probable.

"It must be granted, as you have suggested, that there was such a report among the Jews at the time when that record was made, or else that record would not appear at all to 'advantage' in support of the truth of christianity.

"That 'reason is candid,' I also admit; and if I am blundering in making mistakes, I believe you will have the goodness to acknowledge that I am candid in retracting them again when they are so pointed out to me that I can see them.

"Respecting divine revelation, it is true, I understood you to mean something more than barely what is predicated on the resurrection of Jesus; yet in the second proposition of the three which you made, viz. 'Is the resurrection of Jesus capable of being proved,' I understand you to state one single fact, on which you are willing to rest the final issue of the argument. This being the most important fact, relative to the truth of christianity, and which, probably, is as difficult of proof as any, I do not perceive any disingenuousness in confining you _now_ to this proposition till it is either proved or admitted. Neither do I perceive how this can embarrass your argument, as you have proposed to consider them 'true, disjunctively,' as well as conjunctively. When therefore you have proved the three propositions _disjunctively_; particularly the second, above named, then I shall be willing you should avail yourself of their _union_.--You may say, perhaps, I have proposed to admit the truth of your three propositions; but you will also perceive, it was only for the sake of introducing a fourth proposition, which it will not be necessary for you to consider until the three first are proved true.

"I conceive that reason has no more to do in this case than to judge of the evidences of facts; and then, if the facts are supported, reason can judge of their relation one to the other; but to assume, in the first place, the truth of revelation, and then infer from _that_ the probability of the truth of the resurrection of Jesus, appears to me to be unreasonable. Therefore, if you attempt to prove the truth of revelation, I conceive you must in the first place prove, 'disjunctively,' the truth of the resurrection. If, therefore, you have considered yourself excused from proving the facts on which the truth of revelation seems to rest, because I have granted them for the sake of the argument, you have misapprehended my meaning. I grant _nothing_, respecting the main question, until it is _proved_.

"Notwithstanding what you have said about 'the known facts,' and 'facts which you grant, for the sake of the argument,' &c. you will perceive by my seventh number, that I do not consider the 'miracles of Jesus, his resurrection, and the miracles wrought by the apostles,' either granted or proved, i. e. in relation to the main question; and hence, whatever weight your argument may have, when you have succeeded in that (if you should succeed at all) at present they seem to be hardly conclusive. I know it would save you much time, if you could draw from me an acknowledgement of the truth of the facts on which you rely; and you seem to argue, if I understand you, as though that was already the case; but whatever you may have understood, I must distinctly disavow any such acknowledgement; and I shall still expect (unless it is done in answer to my seventh number) when you come to reply to this, that you will state distinctly, and together, the evidences and arguments on which you mostly rely.

"If, however, you have meant nothing more by all this than to point out the use you shall make of the miracles, &c. (which have been granted for the sake of the argument) when those miracles, &c. shall have been either proven, or else acknowledged true, in relation to the main question, then I have no fault to find; but otherwise, your argument in this place seems to be a little premature.

"You say, 'the known facts, such as the miracles, &c. I used as proof of the divine mission of the servants of God. This divine mission being proved gives the ground on which I contend for the merit of their testimony, concerning a future state.'

"Here you will perceive, sir, that, according to your own statement, to prove this divine mission, you must first prove the certainty of those miracles, &c. on which the truth of the divine mission is predicated. And these are things about the truth of which, as I indicated all along, there may be serious doubts.

"I am at a loss also to understand, what you mean by a 'divine mission.' You inform me that I misapprehended you 'in supposing that' you 'mean to contend, that what the apostles have said respecting a future state, was spoken by way of _conclusions_ from certain known facts.' Here, I must confess, I am really at a loss to understand you: how that either Jesus, or his apostles, could understand a divine mission, even if they had received one, unless it were by _conclusions_ from _certain known facts_, that is, facts well known to them, I cannot conceive; and therefore must have some further explanation on this subject before I can fully answer you. For I must be better informed than I am at present, what you mean by a _divine mission_, before I can see the necessity of 'denying the reality of those miracles--or of granting the authority of their (Christ and his apostles) testimony;' that is, in regard to a future state. But even if I should be made to see this, it would be of no use for the present; because as it respects the final issue of the argument, I have not, neither do I now admit the reality of those miracles: as you must have seen by my seventh number.

"The next particular which demands notice is the quoted passage which I pronounced _Most excellent_!

"Here a serious query suggests itself to my mind. I ask myself: am I, or am I not, as capable of writing my sentiments, so as to be understood by a rational man, as those plain illiterate men who wrote the gospels? And yet if my words are so wrested by logical _twisticisms_ (if I may be allowed to use that expression) so as to mean what never entered my heart, and all this with apparent serious candor too, what may have been the fate of the writings of the evangelists? Now this is something in which I cannot be deceived, i. e. as it respects myself; for any man of common sense does know his own meaning, whether his words fully express his meaning or not, or whether they may be made to mean something else or not.

"Permit me therefore once more to explain. The expression, _Most excellent_! was not so much intended to have been applied to the sentence preceding it, as to the author of that sentence, whose goodness, in stating so explicitly what he understands by the christian faith, I commended. And you must excuse me for not being able to see any inconsistency, absurdity, or contradiction in my words which follow that expression. Suppose a case. You have a good and faithful servant, who feels happy in your service, and is perfectly contented with his fare. You promise him with some favours which you had never before made known to him. He is elated with the idea of your goodness, which he has never doubted, but did not know till now that it was to be manifested in this particular way. You tell him that a knowledge of this, with his former knowledge, 'is as much as his present welfare requires.' He very readily assents to the truth of the proposition; and further adds, it is even 'more than is necessary for his present welfare,' for he was contented and happy before. Would any rational man say that your servant talked unreasonably? Would he say that such reasoning was absurd? I think not. Your servant does not despise either your goodness or your bounty; he considers that his master knows best, what is best for his servant; and he receives with gratitude whatever is bestowed. Your argument would have appeared to me more just, if, after fully understanding me, which I perceive, by the use you have made of the quotation from my sixth number, you now do, you had proved from well known facts, or from conclusive argument, the absolute necessity of the hope of a christian in order for the 'present welfare' of mankind. In doing this you would have ingenuously refuted the proposition which I say would have been _exactly right_.

"You do not seem, sir, yet to have fully understood me as to my object in searching for truth. You ask, saying, 'Do you not appear to be solicitous to have your doubts removed, without expecting the least advantage by it?' You must know, sir, that this is only on supposition, that my doubts are founded in error; in which case I should reap the advantage, as my object is truth. You will recollect that my first object was to search for _moral truth_; without being at all solicitous where, or on what ground it shall be found. Truth _only_ is my object. In this _only_ I feel at all interested in this argument. Hence I shall be just as much obliged to you to _confirm_ me in my doubts, admitting they are founded in truth, as I shall to _remove_ them, admitting they are founded in error.

"I once thought just as you, viz. that the idea and contemplation of enjoying future life was absolutely necessary to present enjoyment; but I am now fully convinced, yea, more, it is absolutely known to be a fact, that the idea is altogether visionary and illusive. I admit that a knowledge of the truth, so far as the truth may be known, is perfectly _congenial_ with the present happiness of mankind: though it is often the case that a partial knowledge of the truth, in relation to any particular subject, produces distress and misery rather than enjoyment. I now am very happy in knowing some things, which, once, only the idea of their being true would have given me pain. I am inclined to think that the idea of _now_ enjoying the pleasures, or _now_ enduring the pains of a future life is altogether chimerical. I can enjoy the life or lives of others in a future tense just as well as I can _now_ enjoy my own future life. I have as much reason to believe that rational intelligence always did exist, as I have to believe it always will; yea, one idea is just as certain to me as the other, and no more so. And as I cannot reflect on the idea of eternity past, only with a kind of reverential _awe_ mingled with sublime pleasure; so the idea of eternity to come produces in me the same sensation; yea, feeling myself equally ignorant of both, (which must be the case on the supposition that revelation is not true.) I can perceive no difference. I feel anxious to know, however, every thing which can be known on this subject; and yet, at the same time, I am inclined to think I should _doubt_ of every revelation of which I can have any conception, unless it should be so made that I could see its truth, (or at least the evidences of its truth) over and over again, and that they should still remain by me at all times, so that I could examine them, and re-examine them, the same as I now look at the stars in the firmament.

"Thus I have opened my mind to you, more fully than I have ever done before, on this subject; and notwithstanding your writings may be very beneficial to others (as well as mine, for some may stand in need of one, and some of the other) yet, here comes up my doubts again, if I am benefited by them, I expect it will be in a different way than that of being any more persuaded of the truth of divine revelation. Nevertheless, I am no less anxious to continue the correspondence on this account.

"Your address to TRUTH, which you are pleased to put into the mouth of my argument, is closed with an idea which does not grow out of my hypothesis. 'The joyous expectation of soon losing sight of thee (i. e. truth) forever in the ellysium of non existence!' _Non-existence_, sir, does not _exist_! Neither does the term convey an idea to my understanding of any thing. I know of no existence, neither can I conceive of any, except that which I believe to be eternal in its nature. And the idea of _something_ being formed or made out of _nothing_, or of something's returning to nothing again, I have long since exploded. Every thing, however, excepting first principles, is liable to _change_. Hence arises the various modes, states, circumstances, conditions and situations in beings and things: also their different properties, relations and dependences.

"I know not whether consciousness is a being, or whether it be only a mode of being. If it be the former, it always did, and always will exist, in some state or other; if the latter, the state of the being may be so changed that although identity exists, yet consciousness is not there. And there is no more absurdity in this idea than there is in supposing that the same matter which forms a _cube_, may become a _globe_. I can as well conceive of a conscious being to day, becoming unconscious to-morrow, as I can conceive of a person in a sound sleep. But _non-existence_ (strictly speaking) sounds to my understanding something like the _falsity of truth_!

"I now come to your reply to my sixth number; and in my remarks, which will be but few, I shall follow the arrangement which you have made.

"1st. The candid concessions which you have made, and the charity which you have extended towards doubting Christians, or candid unbelievers (for such I conceive there may be) is honourable both to yourself and to the cause which you have espoused, and your writing, of course gains a much more favourable reception than the writings of those who appear to be filled with a spirit of acrimony, and are ready at once to deal out anathemas against every thing of which they cannot approve. But, sir, you will permit me to say, we ought to be cautious, lest our personal attachment to an author, and his charitable feelings towards us be such, as imperceptibly to blind us to correct reason, and cause us to imbibe his errors, merely because they are his, and mistake them for truth.

"I am well aware that I should find it difficult to prove that I now believe what I do without a miracle, as you have suggested; for if miracles have existed they may have, indirectly, more influence in my mind than I am at present sensible of; and therefore I will not undertake to say that I am not principally indebted to them for my present views of the character of the supreme Being. I am disposed to acknowledge in humble gratitude all the blessings which I have received, and am made sensible of, let them come to me by what means, or through what channel soever. But I do not see how you had a right to expect that I should either _refute_, or else _acquiesce_ in your opinion on this subject.--What! must I either prove that there have been no such things as miracles, or else admit their truth! Must I either refute your notion that they have had great influence on my faith and practice, or else '_express my acquiescence_' that such is the fact! Hard lines! I choose to take the easier course, and confess that I am too ignorant to do either. I am willing, however, still to be instructed.

"2d. I have nothing at present to say on the subject of prophecy; i.e. to reconcile the pretensions to it with the honesty of the prophets, without admitting divine inspiration, better than what I have written in my seventh number. When I have received your answer to that I may have something more to write. I would suggest, however, here, that as you frequently make use of the expression 'divine inspiration,' I want the expression more fully defined and explained. I have no distinct idea, that I know of, of _divine inspiration_. I suppose you mean the same by it which you did by the 'divine mission,' given to the apostles, or at least something similar; but still I am ignorant of the subject. You have sometimes spoken of divine revelation, as though it was something distinct from this divine mission, and which was a proof of it; but, you must excuse me, I am still all in the dark about it. Do be so good as to inform me how you suppose the prophets, or apostles, or even Jesus, could know for a certainty that they were divinely inspired?

"3. When I acknowledged that there are evidences in favour of divine revelation, I did not suppose it necessary to state what those evidences are; because some of them, to say the least, are very apparent. The bare report of any thing, I conceive to be evidence of the report's being true; and would be sufficient to acquire belief should nothing arise in the mind to counterbalance it: and as I had repeatedly promised to give you the reasons for my doubts I expected to have been indulged a little longer before I should have been again faulted on this subject. But as it respects this matter I am all patience and submission, if it may be so that truth shall finally come to light.

"Under this article you have gone into a very lengthy discussion to shew that the evidence by which the apostles believed in the resurretion could not be counterbalanced, &c. And if I understand what you have written it amounts in my mind to about the following, viz. the apostles could not have been convinced of the fact of the resurrection by any evidence short of the fact itself. 2dly. If the fact did exist there is no evidence which can conterbalance it. _Ergo_. As the apostles were convinced of the truth, the fact did exist. This is pretty much like saying, if the fact were _true_, it could not have been _false_! But I spoke of the evidence in relation to _ourselves_ rather than the _apostles_: we believe or disbelieve for ourselves, and by such evidence as _we_ have. You think if twelve men should testify in favour of a resurrection, and the body could not be found, 'various opinions would result from such evidence.' If so, some might believe the account true; and they might persuade others to believe it; and only let it be reported and believed that some one had died for the truth of it, and it would make no difference after this, as it respects the influence of faith, whether the account was true or false.

"You will excuse me for making no further remarks on what you have written under this article till you have answered my seventh number, and also given me a more clear definition of _divine inspiration_.

"4. What you have written under the fourth article, generally speaking, is satisfactory, till I come to the last sentence; and even with that I have not much fault to charge you with. It is true we may be mistaken as to our ideas of the eternity or immutability of any thing; but then, as it respects argument, it is just as well as though we were correct, as no one can prove us otherwise; no, nor even raise a reasonable doubt on the subject. But even if it could be demonstrated that there is not a rational being now in the universe who existed two centuries ago, or one who will exist two centuries hence, I conceive, as the fact could not, so the knowledge of the fact ought not to make any difference in the relation, dependence and moral obligation between man and man. Man learns by his own experience, as well as from the experience of others; and _vice versa_; hence we profit by the experience of those who have gone before us.

"When man shall universally learn this great moral truth that much of his happiness is inseparably connected with the happiness of his fellow beings, which is one of the immutable principles of moral nature, then each individual will strive to the utmost to promote the general welfare; for in so doing he increases his own individual happiness, and also the happiness of posterity.

"5. What you have said under the fifth article, for reasons already given, will be considered in my next number, when I hope I shall he furnished with more light on the subject.

"I will only observe here that a miracle, as I conceive, must be performed agreeable to, or else it must be a violation of the laws of nature. If the former, whatever it might be to others, to those who understood the means of its operation, it could be, strictly speaking, no miracle; and if no miracle, no evidence, to them, of divine inspiration: but if the latter, and those who performed the same were ignorant of the power by which they were performed, I do not see how that the performance of a miracle could give them any knowledge of futurity. And if not, what did give it to them, and in what way was it given?

"It will still be recollected that I do not admit the existence of miracles, although I speak of them as though they were true, merely to shew that even if they were true I should still have my difficulties respecting the truth of divine revelation.

"6th. Your remarks under the sixth article are satisfactory, though they have not convinced me of the incorrectness of my opinion; because that which is founded in _truth_ is, after all the only thing that is 'good and nourishing' to the understanding. The sound mind pants only after truth; and as he knows eternal truth is unalterable, he is not foolish enough even to desire, it should be what it is not. The reason why we often desire that which we cannot have is because, not knowing the whole truth, we do not know but that we may have the things we desire.

"7th. As it respects 'not even deserving a future existence,' I was not fully understood. I only meant an _anxious_ desire, as I expressed a little before, and as also I expressed _anxious concern_ a little after; that is a desire which is incompatible with reconciliation to truth whether that truth gives us little or much. Had not truth been favourable to our existence we certainly should not have existed; and I can see no reason to fear a truth which has been so favourable as to give us being. It is true, a desire to exist as long as we can enjoy life seems to be inseparably connected with our moral nature; and yet I can see no terror in that which takes away our sensibility, whether it be for a night, for ages, or for eternity. I should just as soon think of being terrified at the idea of a sound and sweet sleep. If the truth be what I suspect it is, I see no good reason why it should be revealed to us, any more than the hour of our death! This truth is wisely concealed from us.

"8th. You have seen me so long in the dark that I begin to doubt whether you would be willing to own me correct, even if I should come fully into the light; i. e. according to your understanding. Is it possible sir, that you should suppose me capable of writing so great a solecism as the following, viz.: If a revelation were ever necessary, it was necessary only to convince mankind that a revelation is not true! But it seems that such must have been your construction, or very near it, or else you could not have found the error of so great magnitude, of which you speak. Although I did not express my idea so full and explicit as I might, and perhaps ought to have done, yet I can assure you that, by reconciling man to his present state, I meant nothing less than what you have expressed in a former letter; and I meant to include all for which you have contended in the article now under consideration. For 1st. If divine revelation were necessary, the thing revealed is undoubtedly true. 2d. If true, I am fully satisfied with your views on the subject.

"9th. Your explanation relative to what you suggested in a former letter (i. e. _that I must mean that the apostles stated falsehood_) is satisfactory; though what you now say you meant, as I have already informed you, was not exactly my meaning. The fact is, I did not mean to express any opinion as to the truth or to the falsity of the apostles' testimony. I very readily grant, however, that, if I 'do not _believe_ that they stated the truth' 'I must believe that they stated falsehood;' unless (which would be very extraordinary) the weight of evidence be so exactly balanced in my mind that it is impossible for me to form an opinion on the subject.--But supposing I disbelieved their testimony altogether; what could I do more than to give my reasons for not believing it? Would it be reasonable to call on me to prove their testimony false? It is a very hard thing to prove a negative!

"You will have already perceived by my seventh number that I have no idea that the facts on which the Christian religion is said to have been founded can now be proved false. No, whatever might have been the case in the time of it, they were neglected too long before any attempt of this kind was made, though the accounts should have been supposed ever so erroneous as to promise any success in their refutation. And I am inclined to think that one century _then_ would involve facts in as much obscurity as five centuries would _now_. But I have already expressed my doubts whether the facts on which the religion of the _Shakers_ is said to be predicated, although not half a century standing, can now be proved false; and yet if they are true they are nothing short of miraculous.

"The Christian religion therefore, true or false, undoubtedly will stand, in some shape or other, and be believed more or less, as long as man remains upon the earth. For if it was introduced without any violations of the laws of nature, i. e. without miracles, which probably was the case, if false, we cannot expect any such violations for the sake of destroying it; and without such violations I do not see how it could be destroyed, because the believers of it, invariably, believe it to be established on such mysterious supernatural principles; and I expect but very few, comparatively, will ever have sufficient strength of mind to throw off the mystic veil.

"Yours, &c.

A. KNEELAND."